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COMMENTARY
UNDER ADVISEMENT: ATTORNEY FEE
FORFEITURE AND THE SUPREME COURT
Stacy Caplow*
INTRODUCTION
This term the Supreme Court will resolve the debate over
whether legitimate attorneys' fees are included within the forfei-
ture provisions of the Continuing Criminal Enterprise' (CCE)
and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization' (RICO)
statutes.3 Having granting certiorari in two cases, decided en
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- 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In both cases charges were brought
under the CCE statute. However, the terms of the forfeiture provisions of the statutes
are identical so that the court's ruling will apply to RICO as well.
- On the eve of the final printing of this Article, the Supreme Court decided two
cases. United States v. Monsanto, 57 U.S.L.W. 4826 (U.S. June 22,1989); Caplin & Drys-
dale, Chartered v. United States, 57 U.S.L.W. 4836 (U.S. June 22, 1989). Both 5-4 deci-
sions, written by an identical lineup of justices, essentially held that no interpretation of
the statute nor constitutional right prevented the pretrial restraint or post-conviction
forfeiture of assets needed by a defendant to pay attorney's fees. Neither of the majority
opinions, authored by Justice White, contained any real surprises; rather they mirrored
the arguments and basic structure of the pro-forfeiture circuit court decisions. United
States v. Bisell, 866 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d
706, reh'g denied, No. 87-1670 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1988
(10th Cir. 1988); In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d
637 (4th Cir. 1988). Right up to this last, narrowly divided decision, fee forfeiture has
evoked strong emotions and bold rhetoric from the jurists who have analyzed its
implications.
On the statutory claim, the majority opinion in Monsanto memorably stated: "In
enacting § 853, Congress decided to give force to the old adage that 'crime does not pay.'
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banc in their respective circuits, In re Forfeiture Hearings as to
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered4 and United States v. Mon-
santo,6 the Court should have the opportunity to consider a
range of statutory and constitutional issues raised by this con-
troversial application of an otherwise sensible and powerful stat-
utory innovation. Attention to the concerns raised by these cases
has been substantial, not only among criminal defense lawyers,
who naturally feel quite affected by what they perceive to be an
attack by the government on the right to counsel and the attor-
ney-client relationship,6 but also from the legislature,7 estab-
lished professional organizations,8 and legal scholars." Despite
We find no evidence that Congress intended to modify that nostrum to read, 'crime does
not pay, except for attorney's fees.' ". 57 U.S.L.W. at 4829. Both majority opinions rather
cursorily repudiated the equitable discretion interpretation of the statute. Id.; Caplin &
Drysdale, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4837. See text accompanying notes 130-36 and 149-53 infra.
Furthermore, having found no statutory exemption, the Court repudiated claims raising
the denial of counsel of choice under the sixth amendment. Monsanto, 57 U.S.L.W. at
4830; Caplin & Drysdale, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4838-40. See text accompanying notes 54-97
infra. Nor did the Court credit the fifth amendment fundamental fairness due process
claim. Monsanto, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4830; Caplin & Drysdale, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4840. See text
accompanying notes 137-42. Finally, in Monsanto, the Court additionally rejected the
argument that pre-trial restraint of forfeitable property was tantamount to the imposi-
tion of punishment before conviction. Monsanto, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4830. Only the question
such as the one fashioned by the circuit court in Monsanto, of whether the absence of a
post-indictment hearing violates procedural due process was unresolved. Monsanto, 57
U.S.L.W. at 4830 n.10. See text accompanying notes 98-111 and 167-74 infra.
4 109 S. Ct. 363, granting cert., 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988), rev'g in part on reh'g
en banc sub nom., United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987). These two cases
were argued before the Supreme Court on March 21, 1989. 57 U.S.L.W. 3631 (Mar. 28,
1989).
109 S. Ct. 363, granting cert., 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988), vacating on reh'g en
banc, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987).
6 The most prolific critic of these practices is Professor William J. Genego. See
Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROoKLYN L. REV. 781 (1988) [hereinafter New Adver-
sary]; Genego, The Legal and Practical Implications of Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees, 36
EMORY L.J. 837 (1987) [hereinafter Genego, Implications]; Genego, Prosecutorial Control
Over a Defendant's Choice of Counsel, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 17 (1987) [hereinafter
Genego, Prosecutorial Control]; Genego, Risky Business: The Hazards of Being a Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyer, 1 A.BA CRIM. JusT. 2 (1986) [hereinafter Genego, Risky Business].
See also Kadish, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Can it Stand its Ground Against New
Government Intrusions, 36 EMORY L.J. 793 (1987); Krieger & Van Dusen, The Lawyer,
the Client and the New Law, 22 Am. CiM. L. REv. 737 (1984); Margolin, Musings on
Mega Trials and Mega Bucks, 36 EMoRY L.J. 811 (1987); Robinson, Targeting Lawyers,
Nat'l L.J., Jan. 21, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
7 See Attorneys' Fees Forfeiture, Hearing before the Committee of the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 2d Sess 1 (May 13, 1986) [hereinafter Forfeiture Hearings].
' The Committee on Criminal Advocacy, The Forfeiture of Attorney Fees in Crimi-
nal Cases: A Call for Immediate Remedial Action, 41 REc. A.B. N.Y. 469 (1986). In July
[Vol. 55:111l
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the relatively sparse number of cases in which fee forfeiture has
1985, the American Bar Association approved a resolution disapproving "of the use of
the forfeiture provisions of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 ... in the
absence of reasonable grounds to believe that an attorney has engaged in criminal con-
duct and/or has accepted a few as a fraud or sham to protect illegal activity of a client."
Forfeiture Hearings, supra note 7, at 93 (reproducing ABA CRMNAL JusrcE SEcTo,
REPoRT To THE HoUSE OF DELEGATES). See also Lawyers Concerns over Government
Tactics Aired at ABA Convention, [Aug.] Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 2400-02 (Aug.
27, 1986).
9 Blakey, Forfeiture of Legal Fees: Who Stands to Lose?, 36 EMoRY LJ. 781 (197);
Bonner, A Balanced Perspective on Attorney Subpoenas, 36 EmoRY L.J. 803 (1987);
Brickey, Attorneys' Fee Forfeitures: On Defining "What" and "When" and Distinguish-
ing "Ought" from "Is", 36 EMORY L.J. 761 (1987); Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees:
The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. Rav. 493
(1986) [hereinafter Brickey, Impact]; Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Apply-
ing an Institutional Role Theory to Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1937 WIs.
L Rav. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Cloud, Forfeiting]; Cloud, Government Intrusions into the
Attorney-Client Relationship: The Impact of Fee Forfeitures on the Balance of Power
in the Adversary System of Criminal Justice, 36 EMORY W. 817 (1987); Fossum, Crimi-
nal Forfeiture and the Attorney-Client Relationship: Are Attorneys' Fees Up for Grabs,
39 Sw. LJ. 1067 (1986); Genego, Implications, supra note 6; Genego, Prosecutorial Con-
trol, supra note 6; Genego, Risky Business, supra note 6; Kadish, supra note 6; Krieger
& Van Dusen, supra note 6; Margolin, supra note 6; Markus, Procedural Implications of
Forfeiture Under RICO, the CCE, and the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1934: Re-
forming the Trial Structure, 59 TEhip. LQ. 1097 (1986); Mass, Forfeiture of Attorneys'
Fees: Should Defendants Be Allowed to Retain the "Rolls Royce of Attorneys" with the
"Fruits of the Crime"?, 39 STAN. L REV. 663 (1987); Morgan, An Introduction to the
Debate Over Fee Forfeitures, 36 EMORY W. 755 (1987); Morris, Attorney Fee Forfeiture,
86 COLUm L REV. 1021 (1986); Pate, Payment of Attorneys' Fees with Potentially For-
feitable Assets, 22 CRML L. BuL 326 (1986); Reed, Criminal Forfeiture Under the Com-
prehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Raising the Stakes, 22 AL CRi. L. Rav. 747 (1987);
Uelmen, Converting Retained Lawyers into Appointed Lawyers: The Ethical and Tacti-
cal Implications, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1987); Viles, Criminal Procedure IV: Attor-
ney's Fees Forfeiture and Subpoenaing Defendants' Attorneys, 1986 ANN. SURV. Au L.
335; Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of
1984: Not What Congress Ordered, 16 BALTMORE L. REv. 120 (1986); Note, Today's
RI.C.O. and Your Disappearing Legal Fee, 15 CAP. U.L. REv. 59 (1985); Note, State and
Federal Forfeiture of Property Involved in Drug Transactions, 92 Dim L. REv. 461
(1988); Note, A Critical Appraisal of the Justice Department Guidelines for Grand
Jury Subpoenas Issued to Defense Attorneys, 1986 DuKE L.J. 145; Note, Forfeiture of
Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE, 54 FoRDHmx L. Rav. 1171 (1986); Note, A Propo-
sal to Reform Criminal Forfeiture Under RICO and CCE, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1929 (1984);
Note, United States v. Harvey: Are Criminal Defense Fees More Vulnerable than Nec-
essary?, 47 MD. L. REv. 322 (1987); Note, Attorneys' Fees Forfeiture Under the Compre-
hensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Can We Protect Against Sham Transfers to Attorneys?,
62 NoTRE DAms L REv. 734 (1987); Note, Against Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under
RICO: Protecting the Constitutional Rights of Criminal Defendants, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
124 (1986); Note, Criminal Law: Criminal Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO, 40
OKLA. L. REv. 268 (1987); Note, Forfeiture of Attorney Fees Under RICO's New Amend-
ments, 32 ST. Louis U.LJ. 199 (1987); Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: A Trap for
the Unwary, 88 W. VA. L REv. 825 (1986); Note, RICO and the Forfeiture of Attorneys'
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been contested, indicating some voluntary restraint by the gov-
ernment,10 the potential impact of attorney fee forfeiture on the
traditional roles and balance of power in the adversary system is
profound."
This Commentary will trace the background of the problem
and explore the possible statutory or constitutional justifications
available to the Supreme Court in the context of the two cases,
which taken together articulate most of the arguments that have
evolved since the passage of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act
of 1984 (CFA). Caplin & Drysdale represents a prototypical
analysis of the position that neither the statute nor the Consti-
tution require exclusion of fees from the reach of forfeiture. The
Monsanto decision, a sprawling collection of concurring opin-
ions, suggests several possible approaches which, if fully devel-
oped by the Court, supply principled reasons for excluding fees
despite the extremely persuasive argument that tainted assets
should not be available to a defendant for any use, even pay-
ment to a lawyer. Next, this Commentary will venture into the
treacherous territory of fortunetelling by attempting to preview
the Supreme Court's decisions of the two cases. In the last part
of the Commentary, specific statutory revisions designed to ex-
empt fees from the reach of forfeiture will be proposed because
on the eve of these decisions, however the court rules, one out-
come is inescapable: legislative reform is imperative. s Congress
should amend the statute to clearly express the view that legiti-
mate, reasonable attorneys' fees are not forfeitable and that law-
yers are not subject to the provisions that apply to other third
parties. Even if the Court finds no statutory or constitutional
Fees: Removing the Adversary from the Adversarial System?, 62 WASH. L. REv, 201
(1987); Note, Forfeitability of Attorneys' Fees Traceable As Proceeds from a RICO Vio-
lation Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 32 WAYNE L. REv. 1499
(1986).
" Guidelines on Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees, U.S. ATTORNEYS MANUAL § 9-111.000
(1988) (hereinafter Guidelines].
1 One judge has colorfully described fee forfeiture as "[a] statutory scheme that
sacrifices the relationship between client and attorney, that invites the prosecutor to un-
dermine the adversarial process, and that imposes sentence before trial (not to mention
that denies a defendant his right to counsel of choice)." United States v. Monsanto, 852
F.2d 1400, 1405 (2d Cir. 1988) (Oakes, J., concurring).
12 Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 413, 98 Stat. 1976, 2049 (1984).
Although the Senate held a hearing in 1986 on fee forfeiture, the record of which
amply sets forth the positions of the government and both the private and public de-
fense bar, no action was taken. See generally Forfeiture Hearings, supra note 7.
(Vol. 55: 111
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basis for insulating fees and distinguishing between lawyers and
other third parties, the statute should be amended in order to
avoid abuse and even the appearance of a challenge to the tradi-
tional attorney-client relationship that has so stirred the critics
of fee forfeiture. 14 The widely held views of the many courts,
attorneys, and bar groups opposing forfeiture highlight the
sound public policy that should impel a legislative response.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Statutes5
Civil forfeiture of the instrumentalities or contraband seized
during the commission of the crime has been an available tool
for a long time. However, its comparatively limited reach to only
specific property used in connection with narcotics activities 0
11 A call for legislative reform was expressed forcefully in the dissent filed jointly in
both cases: '"That a majority of this Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Act as
so interpreted will not deter Congress, I hope, from amending-the Act to make clear that
Congress did not intend this result." Caplin & Drysdale, 5"J U.S.LW. at 4836 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). With somewhat more restraint consistent with its deference to the
preservation of the legislative function, even the majority concedes the possibility that
the result reached in these cases might not be what Congress intended, or at least not
what they ever contemplated: "If... we are mistaken as to Congress' intent, that body
can amend this statute to otherwise provide." Monsanto, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4829.
IS This background will be very brief to enable a reader unfamiliar with the nature
of the problem to quickly grasp its dimensions and to avoid repeating an in depth analy-
sis of the issues for those who have read the literature. Afiything previously written
about fee forfeiture thoroughly discusses the causes of the problem and analyzes or pro-
poses solutions. For the most thoughtful articles, see Brickey, Impact, supra note 9, at
497-503 (supporting fee forfeiture on statutory and constitutional grounds); Cloud,
Forfeiting, supra note 9, at 15-23 (arguing that an analysis of fee forfeiture must address
not only individual rights but also its impact on the adversary system). Yet, even the
most comprehensive recent articles are insufficiently current because the most significant
cases all have been decided within the past year. United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343
(11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Unit 7 & Unit 8 (Kiser), 853 F.2d 1445 (8th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, reh'g denied, No. 87-1670 (7th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Jones, 837
F.2d 1332, reh'g granted, 844 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Forfeiture Hearings as to
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363
(1988); United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (1987), vacated on reh'g en banc, 852
F.2d 1400 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988). The only circuit court cases
decided before 1988 were United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), reo'd in
part on reh'g en banc sub nom. In re Forfeiture Hearings as to Caplin & Drydale,
Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988), and United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463
(1986), modified on denial of reh'g, 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987).
16 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (controlled substances used or in-
tended to be used in manufacturing, compounding, processing, importing, or exporting
1989]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
also limited its effectiveness since the true wealth in the form of
illicit profits of racketeers and drug traffickers remained beyond
reach. In 1970, when the RICO and CCE legislation authorized
the first in personam forfeiture punishment, its purpose was to
strip the economic power of individuals and organizations, and
to destroy their ability to continue their criminal activities after
conviction.17 In addition, forfeiture has the poetic justice of de-
priving convicted defendants of all their ill-gotten gains, thus in-
directly redressing the social harm committed even if not di-
rectly compensating the actual or secondary victims of the
criminal acts.18
When Congress passed amendments to the forfeiture provi-
sions in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,11 it in-
tended to "eliminate the statutory limitations and ambiguities
that have frustrated active pursuit of forfeiture by Federal law
enforcement agencies." 0 In order to increase its potency as a
shall be subject to forfeiture).
17 The original version of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO)
Act provided that:
Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined
not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and
shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interests he has acquired or main-
tained in violation of section 1962, and (2) any interest in, security of, claim
against, or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influ-
ence over, any enterprise which he has established, operated, controlled, con-
ducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 9.01(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970). Similarly, the original Continuing
Criminal Enterprise (CCE) statute provided that:
Any person who is convicted. . . of engaging in a continuing criminal en-
terprise shall forfeit to the United States (A) the profits obtained by him in
such enterprise, and (B) any of his interest in, claim against, or property or
contractual rights of any kind affording a source of influence over, such
enterprise.
Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408(2)(A) & (B), 84 Stat. 1265, 1265-66 (1970).
" The Attorney General may transfer forfeited property to another federal, state, or
local agency. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e). An experimental Justice Department assets forfeiture
fund was created in 1984 from which monies can be appropriated to defray the costs of
the forfeiture actions, 28 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1982), as amended by the Assets Forfeiture
Amendments Act of 1988 (Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988), Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 6071-
6080, 102 Stat. 4320-4327. See also Attorney General's Guidelines on Seized and For-
feited Property, [Jan.] Crin. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 3013-19 (Jan. 6, 1988).
" Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
20 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 192 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. N-Ws 3375. These revisions appear to respond to a report issued in 1981
by the United States General Accounting Office entitled Asset Forfeiture: A Seldom
Used Tool in Combatting Drug Trafficking, which criticized federal agencies for underu-
[Vol. 55: 111
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prosecutorial tool, the 1984 changes expanded the scope of for-
feitable property and closed loopholes permitting preconviction
transfers of assets that had been eviscerating the utility of for-
feiture as a punishment."'
The most consequential change in the 1984 law was the
adoption of the "relation back" doctrine 22 and the accompanying
procedures designed to protect the conditional interest of the
government in the property 3 and to protect innocent third par-
ties.24 Briefly, the relation back doctrine is a legal fiction of
property law that establishes that the defendant was never the
lawful owner of any property or interest that is found forfeita-
ble.25 Although property is forfeited only upon conviction, the
tilizing forfeiture and enumerated limitations and ambiguities in the existing law that
restricted its usefulness.
21 Although Rusello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983), had not been decided at
the time that the amendments were drafted, its eventual holding that profits and pro-
ceeds constitute an "interest" within the meaning of section 1963(a)(1) of title 18 of the
United States Code was reflected in the more expansive definitions and items contained
in the revised version of that section.
" The statute provides:
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) vests in the
United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under
this section. Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person
other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture
and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the trans-
feree establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (1) that he is a bona fide
purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase was reasona-
bly without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under
this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(c). The language of section 853(c) of title 21 of the United States Code
is identical. Parallel amendments to the civil forfeiture statute also were adopted in
1984. "All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section
shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under
this section." 21 U.S.C. § 881(h). The relation back doctrine had long been an accepted
feature of civil forfeiture. See United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890).
Provisions regarding protective orders are found in e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 853(e); 18
U.S.C. § 1963(b).
24 Provisions regarding ancillary hearings to determine rights of third parties are
found in e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(1) & (2); 21 U.S.C. 853(n).
" Forfeitable property is defined by 18 U.S.C. section 1963(a) as:





(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influ-
ence over, any enterprise which the person has established, operated, con-
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government's right, title, and interest vests as of the date of the
commission of the crime giving rise to forfeiture. However, the
government does not acquire actual title to the property until
the defendant's conviction and a finding of forfeitability is made
by the trier of fact. The government, thus, has an unperfected
interest in property it specifies in the indictment as forfeitable.
The effect of this doctrine is to void any interim transfer of the
property to a third party occurring between the date of the com-
mission of the crime until conviction.
In order to protect innocent third parties from losing their
lawfully obtained property, the revised statute establishes a
post-conviction hearing at which bona fide purchasers for value
can pursue their claims. 26 To be successful, the claimants have
to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they were
good faith purchasers and that they had no reasonable cause to
believe that the property was forfeitable at the time of the
transfer.17
It is precisely this requirement of lack of suspicion about
the source of the property that creates the lawyer's dilemma.
Unlike the storekeeper who sells goods or the dentist who pro-
vides services to the defendant, the attorney is likely to know or
at least to reasonably believe that the source of the fee is illegal.
In fact, the failure to ascertain this information might well be a
dereliction of the lawyer's duty to represent the client compe-
tently and diligently. 2s Many defendants prosecuted under
RICO or CCE possess few if any assets that are not forfeitable
since they are basically in the business of crime. This is particu-
larly true for the drug "kingpins" targeted under the CCE stat-
trolled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section
1962; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt col-
lection in violation of section 1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a).
Forfeitable property is defined somewhat differently in 21 U.S.C. § 853(a). Property
civilly forfeitable is defined in id. § 881(a)(1)-(8).
26 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1); 21 U.S.C. §. 853(n). Before the amendments, if property was
transferred before conviction, the government had no remedy even if the transaction was
designed to circumvent forfeiture. See, e.g., United States v. Truglio, 660 F. Supp. 103,
105 (N.D. W. Va. 1987).
27 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1)(6)(B); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B).
28 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1981) (proposed final draft);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6 (1980).
[Vol. 55:11ll
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ute, because the very definition of that offense requires the de-
fendant to occupy a supervisory or managerial position in a
narcotics organization and to gain "substantial income or re-
sources" from the violations.2 9 To prepare an effective defense,
the attorney necessarily has to become aware of the source of
the income that is an element of the crime. The same is true of
any defendant who is violating the RICO statute by conducting
an illegal enterprise.30 The attorney surely will know that the
fee, just as all the rest of the client's property, is derived from
criminal conduct when the defendant has no obvious or known
legitimate activities.
The mere presence of a forfeiture count in the indictment
would put the attorney on notice to inquire about those assets;3 1
such an inquiry most likely would reveal whether the fee is being
paid from the same source.32 The failure of an attorney to in-
quire about the current status of the allegedly forfeitable assets
would be a serious omission in preparation.
The government imagines a dialogue between lawyer and
client at which the lawyer will determine that there is no reason
to believe the fee is being paid from illicit funds. 3 Although it is
unquestionable that legitimate funds should be consumed first
for all pretrial expenses including legal fees, this conversation
may reveal there will be insufficient or no untainted funds to
pay the attorney's fee or that the client's explanation is not
credible. Once the attorney even suspects that the fee is tainted,
the attorney can no longer claim to be without cause to know
that the fee was subject to forfeiture. Furthermore, the forfei-
ture count on the face of the indictment, the cornerstone of the
attorney's file, may be sufficient by itself to establish a reasona-
29 21 U.S.C. § 848.
30 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
' United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476, 477 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub
nom., Bello v. United States, 469 U.S. 837 (1984). A forfeiture count alleging the extent
of the interest or property must be pleaded specifically in the indictment. FED. R. CRU.
P. 7(c)(2). However, this requirement can be satisfied by several types of language: a
specific description (certain numbered stock shares, a particular bank account or piece of
real property), a generic description (unspecified shares of stock, a sum of money), or a
broad, inclusive description ("any and all proceeds or profits of crime"). Guidelines,
supra note 10, § 9-111.511.
21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2)(B).
3 Forfeiture Hearings, supra note 7, at 41 (letter from John R. Bolton, assistant
attorney general, to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (Apr. 18, 1986)) [hereinafter Bolton Letter].
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ble belief that any fee would be tainted so that a post-conviction
hearing, although available, would be doomed. In contrast to
other third parties, the attorney is actually disadvantaged by the
professional relationship to the client.
A similar scenario at the supermarket or the dentist's office
is inconceivable. Before bagging the groceries of the customer re-
puted in the neighborhood to be involved in crime, the clerk
would have to ask where the proffered cash was earned. Or, just
as a reputed narcotics kingpin actually under indictment is hav-
ing root canal work, the dentist, who is aware from the newspa-
pers that the patient is alleged to be a crime figure, would refuse
to inject the novocaine until assured that the patient's assets are
not subject to forfeiture. To further support the claim that law-
yers are being treated more harshly than other third parties,
there is no reported litigation in which other providers of goods
and services have sought to protect their property from forfei-
ture. This absence leads to the inescapable conclusion that the
government is simply not obstructing access to funds for other
third parties who provide legitimate services. 4 Moreover, in
some instances the government does not even have to seek to
regain the transferred assets because substitute assets can be lo-
cated. Therefore, if the defendant sells a house to an innocent
third party, the government can go after the profits of the sale
rather than try to seize the house and litigate with the bona fide
purchaser. In contrast, no comparable tangible exchange with a
lawyer has occurred so that the only recoverable asset is the fee
owed or actually paid.
The problem for the lawyer is compounded by the extent of
the reach back in time of the relation back doctrine. Although
an indictment pleading forfeitable assets may be sufficient to
put an attorney on notice of the vulnerability of the fee, the na-
ture of the attorney-client relationship may date this suspicion
even earlier than indictment. During the preindictment investi-
gative period, an attorney may represent a client before the
grand jury and at plea discussions or may simply advise the de-
fendant more generally. This preindictment period may be ex-
34 One of the few reported cases determining the claims of bona fide purchasers
arose out of the original prosecution of Reckmeyer, Caplin & Drysdale's client. The case
held that, after an ancillary hearing, a third party established a superior right to for-
feited property. See United States v. Reckmeyer, 627 F. Supp. 412,414 (E.D. Va. 1986).
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tensive, depending entirely on the length of time the govern-
ment takes to prepare its case. Yet, any fees owed or paid for
services rendered during this time can be restrained prior to,
and recaptured after, conviction as long as the crimes alleged
occurred prior to the services rendered.
By following its voluntary guidelines, the United States At-
torney's office maintains that it has mitigated the harshness of
the relation back doctrine as it applies to attorneys' fees.30
Adopted in 1985, the main feature of the guidelines is their re-
quirement of "reasonable grounds to believe that the attorney
have actual knowledge" that the property was forfeitable at the
time of its transfer in order to pursue forfeiture of a fee.30 Civil
forfeiture proceedings or a forfeiture count in the indictment
naming a particular asset would provide indisputable actual
knowledge of forfeitability, whereas more general pleadings such
as "all profits of proceeds of the criminal activity" might be in-
sufficient to demonstrate reason to know.3 7 The accusatory in-
strument is, of course, the most direct, but not the only, means
of proving knowledge.
Despite this purported restraint on the discretion of the
prosecutor to seek forfeiture of attorneys' fees, the guidelines
"may not be ruled on to create any rights, substantive or proce-
dural, enforceable at law by any party. . nor do they place any
limitations on otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives of the De-
partment of Justice. 3 8 More telling perhaps is that none of the
major cases litigated since the adoption of the guidelines demon-
strate any particular effort on the government's part to be selec-
tive about its opposition to the release of restrained funds to pay
fees. All reveal an aggressive stance against applications for re-
lease of assets to pay fees, particularly in cases of defendants
who are drug kingpins.39
Forfeiture Hearings, supra note 7, at 29 (statement of Stephen S. Trott, assistant
attorney general).
36 Guidelines, supra note 10, § 9-111.430.
-Id. § 9-111.520.
- Id. § 9-111.400.
39 The majority of cases have involved prosecutions under the CCE statute and re-
lated other charges. In a few cases, charges have been brought under both CCE and
RICO statutes: United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987); United State3 v.
Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Only a few attorneys' fees cases arose in
cases where RICO alone was charged: United States v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332, reh'g
granted, 844 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452
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B. History of the Cases
From the first, the question of whether attorneys' fees are
forfeitable was destined for Supreme Court review. When the
CFA was passed in 1984, Congress almost deliberately avoided
creating a record about its view on the forfeitability of fees.4"
Left to the task of interpreting the statute and ruling on its con-
stitutionality as applied to attorneys' fees, the district and cir-
cuit courts have been divided both internally and between
themselves.
Although there is considerable consensus that the intent of
the statute was to not exclude fees, impassioned and persuasive
arguments have been made on both sides of the constitutional
claims. The checkered history of the two cases before the Su-
preme Court reflect the maturation of the analysis and difficul-
ties that the district and then the circuit courts have had in ad-
dressing this issue.
1. Caplin & Drysdale
Although the Caplin & Drysdale sequence has not been the
only circuit court decision to address the various statutory and
constitutional claims, it stands as a prototype of the evolution of
the challenges against fee forfeiture from the initially mixed
statutory-sixth amendment analysis in the district courts, to the
invalidation of fee forfeiture on constitutional grounds, to the
final repudiation of constitutional rule making. A review of the
development, sharpening, and, in some instances, abandonment
of these arguments microcosmically introduces the full range of
issues. This case provides a window through which to examine
the various claims.
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985). A possible
explanation for the imbalance is that RICO defendants charged with committing busi.
ness or white collar crimes are more likely to have other, untainted assets earned at
noncriminal activities or even inherited or family wealth.
40 The only direct reference to the potential problem contained in the legislativo
history stated: "Nothing in this section [authorizing restraining orders] is intended to
interfere with a person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Committee therefore
does not resolve the conflict of District Court opinions on the use of restraining orders
that impinge on a person's right to counsel in a criminal case." H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th




Caplin & Drysdale originated as three cases arising in three
different fee forfeiture contexts. In the first, United States v.
Reckmeyer,41 in which the defendant was represented by the law
firm of Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, the defense attorneys had
received payment before indictment. After conviction and a
judgment, they asked for the release of forfeited assets to pay
additional fees owed. The trial court relied on specific passages
in the legislative history to hold that Congress did not intend for
legitimate attorneys' fees to be forfeitable under the CCE stat-
ute and that any such interpretation of the statute would violate
the defendant's right to counsel of choice and to effective assis-
tance of counsel.42
In United States v. Bassett,43 the second case of the trilogy,
the government had notified defense counsel of its intention to
pursue forfeiture of fees if the defendants were convicted. The
district court construed the statute to apply only to sham or
fraudulent transactions to any third parties, including attorneys.
The decision avoided any direct constitutional pronouncement,
yet it alluded its concern over the potential sixth amendment
problems inherent in fee forfeiture.44
Like Reckmeyer and Bassett, other district court cases have
held the statute did not extend to legitimate attorneys' fees
largely because to say otherwise would run afoul of the right to
counsel.45 The consistency of these decisions signaled a forceful
"1 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd sub nor. United States v. Harvey, 814
F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987).
42 631 F. Supp. at 1195-97. "The purpose of this provision [relation back] is to per-
mit the voiding of certain pre-conviction transfers and so close a potential loophole in
current law whereby the criminal forfeiture sanction could be avoided by transfers that
were not 'arms' length' transactions." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 200-01
(1984), reprinted in 1984 US. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEWS 3383-84. "The provision [an-
cillary hearing] should be construed to deny relief to third parties acting as nominees of
the defendant or who have knowingly engaged in sham or fraudulent transactions." Id.
at 209 n.47, reprinted in 1984 US. CODE CONG. & ADbMi. NEws 3392 nA7.
43 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986), affd sub. nor. United States v. Harvey, 814
F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987).
44 632 F. Supp. at 1315-16.
41 United States v. Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 455-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United
States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Rogers,
602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985). None of these cases were themselves reversed.
See also United States v. Estevez, 645 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. Wis. 1986), rev'd sub noma.
United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 723-25 (7th Cir. 1988) (The Seventh Circuit
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intuitive reaction by trial court judges to this perceived exten-
sion of government power interfering with the right to counsel
and altering the fundamental fairness of adversarial process. Ba-
sically, those district courts exempting fees have held that to
read the statute otherwise would interfere with the right of
counsel of choice.46
After this initial spate of district court cases, all circuit
courts considering the question of statutory intent have con-
cluded the provision does not necessarily exclude assets. Using
traditional methods of statutory construction, 7 most courts
have found no literal or historical support for exempting fees.48
concluded that the statute as written applies to attorneys' fees. Such application does
not necessarily constitute a denial of the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.).
But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2, 1985, 605 F. Supp. 839,
849-50 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.), reu'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985) (Defendant's
sixth amendment right to counsel would not be infringed by admission at trial of infor-
mation by a stipulation regarding defense counsel's fee arrangement with defendant.)
" Estevez, 645 F. Supp. at 872 ("[B]ecause of constitutional questions the statute
raises, it seems reasonable to conclude that Congress intended that legitimate attorneys
fees be excepted."); lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 456 ("It is a fundamental principle of
statutory interpretation that in deciding among possible interpretations of a statute, the
court must select an interpretation that appears to be consistent with the constitutional-
ity of the statute."); Bassett, 632 F. Supp. at 1316 ("This interpretation of the statute
[that only sham or fraudulent transactions are voidable] is further supported when one
considers the constitutional implication of the government's position."); Rechmeyer, 631
F. Supp. at 1196 ("This court's finding that the forfeiture of attorney's fees violates the
Sixth Amendment is therefore not inconsistent with the Congressional intent behind the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, it appearing that it was Congress' intent all along that
the courts would resolve this question."); Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197 ("Absent
some supporting indication in the legislative history, I think it most doubtful that Con-
gress intended by its broad language to cover a special application so clearly at odds with
an accused defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to have counsel to defend the
charge."). See also United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348 (D. Colo. 1985).
Contra United States v. Bailey, 666 F. Supp. 1275, 1276 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (release of
funds seized pursuant to civil forfeiture action not required by sixth amendment);
United States v. Draine, 637 F. Supp. 482, 484 n.2 (S.D. Ala. 1986) (section 853 held to
be constitutional), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 94 (1987).
17 "If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of a 'clearly expressed
legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclu.
sive.'" United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (quoting Consumer Product
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). See also Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983). "[W]hen a statute is fairly susceptible to more
than one interpretation, the interpretation most consistent with constitutionality should
be adopted." United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 917 (2d Cir. 1988).
" United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1350 (11th Cir. 1989). See United States
v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 723 (7th Cir. 1988) (with respect to protective order en-
tered pursuant to forfeiture count of indictment under the CCE statute, there is no ex-
emption for attorneys' fees); United States v. Nichols, 814 F.2d 1485, 1496 (10th Cir.
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By now, this argument has been virtually abandoned by fee for-
feiture opponents in light of the unanimity among the circuit
courts.
4 9
The view that the broad language of the statute itself in-
cludes attorneys' fees is endorsed even by those courts that ulti-
mately have found this application to be unconstitutional.00 For
example, in the third case in the Caplin & Drysdale trilogy,
United States v. Harvey, the district court had issued a re-
straining order barring the defendant from the use of any of his
property to pay fees, holding that the legislative history of the
statute did not exempt fees."' On appeal to the Fourth Circuit,
the three cases were consolidated under the name United States
v. Harvey.52 The circuit court rejected the statutory grounds re-
lied on in Reckmeyer and Bassett, holding that the statute did
not contemplate any special exemption of attorneys' fees from
forfeiture.53 However, as a result of its clear repudiation of any
statutory basis for excluding fees, Harvey became the first cir-
cuit court to deal directly with the constitutional issues without
1988) (neither section 853 nor the legislative history of its amendments of 1984 support a
conclusion favoring exemption of attorneys' fees in the context of a Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act violation). In addition, the direction by Congress that
"the provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial pur-
poses," 21 U.S.C. § 853(o), is likely to doom any efforts to read limiting language into the
statute. See also Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970) (providing similar
directions for the liberal construction of the RICO statute).
"' The petitioner in Caplin & Drysdale does not even argue this statutory claim in
his brief, although the Court will have to rule on this issue since it has been raised in
Monsanto. See Brief for Respondent at 12-30, United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400
(2d Cir.) (No. 88-454), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988). However, in the past, when-
ever the RICO statute has been interpreted, the Supreme Court has followed the direc-
tion of Congress to liberally construe its provisions, thus deferring to Congress to revise
the statute. Given this pattern, an interpretation of the statute by the Supreme Court
that reads into the statute an exclusion for attorneys' fees seems highly unlikely.
"* United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986), modified on denial of rel'g,
809 F.2d 249 (1987).
" United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 912 (4th Cir. 1987).
814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987). The government had appealed Rechmeyer and Bas-
sett; the defendant appealed Harvey.
"The Fourth Circuit stated:
[W]e hold that the critical provisions must be interpreted according to their
literal import and that this contemplates the forfeiture of attorney fees in any
circumstances where the attorney cannot establish that he was "without rea-





cloaking them in statutory guise.
b. Sixth Amendment Claims
The only lawyer-client relationship recognized by the
United States Constitution is that of the criminal defendant and
the defendant's attorney. By its guarantee of counsel to all per-
sons charged with a crime, the sixth amendment assures that at
least one type of participant in the legal system always will be
represented.54 Although this right to retained or appointed coun-
sel is absolute in any case in which the defendant is charged
with an offense for which a term of imprisonment is imposed,
some of the supporting pillars of the sixth amendment, the right
to counsel of choice and the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel, are qualified."
Immediately after the passage of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984 containing the new forfeiture provisions, the
defense bar began to fashion the constitutional objections to the
perceived threat to the right to counsel and the attorney-client
relationship. These arguments have evolved to the point that,
although they can be divided into the three categories discussed
below, the denial of the right to counsel of choice has emerged as
the key claim. In the Caplin & Drysdale sequence, the district
and circuit courts examined all of these sixth amendment
claims.
" "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the Assistance of Coun-
sel in his defense." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
55 Scott v. Illinois, 400 U.S. 367 (1979) (sixth and fourteenth amendments require
that an indigent criminal defendant not be sentenced to imprisonment unless the state
has afforded him right to assistance of appointed counsel); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972) (right of indigent criminal defendant to assistance of counsel not governed
by classification of offense or by whether jury trial required); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1935) (right to appointed counsel afforded to indigent criminal defendants);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1692 (1988) (recognition of limited sixth
amendment right to choose one's own counsel); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
694 (1984) (ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a showing of prejudice suffi-
cient to "undermine confidence in the outcome" of the trial); United States v. Cronik,
466 U.S. 648 (1984); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1983); United States v. Paone,
782 F.2d 386 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); United States v. Curcio, 680




i. Absolute Right to Counsel
The threat of attorney fee forfeiture affects the right to
counsel in several ways. If assets have been sequestered by court
order, a defendant ostensibly qualifies for appointed counsel
under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA).56 An accused whose cur-
rently unrestrained assets may be subject to forfeiture still pos-
sesses funds to hire a lawyer, but anyone taking the case in the
shadow of such a threat would be "foolish, ignorant, beholden or
idealistic. '57 Neither indigent nor solvent, that defendant may
be unable to retain counsel or qualify for appointed counsel and,
thus, be denied the basic right to counsel altogether.58 However,
most recent decisions, including Harvey,59 reject or ignore the
so-called absolute denial of counsel argument on the ground that
the defendant is entitled to appointed counsel if unable to afford
a retained lawyer. Yet, these decisions basically ignore the fact
that in forfeiture cases the availability of funds to retain counsel
is determined solely by the prosecutor's ability to obtain an in-
dictment charging a sweeping forfeiture count. Furthermore, the
appointment of counsel, governed by the provisions of the CJA,
requires the defendant to demonstrate to the court the reasons
for the defendant's inability to obtain counsel, which may re-
quire a release of confidential information."0
This position also overlooks a few key realities. First, the
right to assigned counsel only attaches at a "critical stage,"
which usually means the commencement of criminal proceed-
ings.6 It is generally accepted that a defendant has no right to
counsel at the investigative stage, including the grand jury inves-
tigation, at a precharging conference, or at plea negotiations
which might result in a guilty plea or a cooperation agreement.
Any retained attorney might be loathe to accept the case even
before indictment because of the threat that payment for ser-
18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) [hereinafter CJA].
17 United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
5 To qualify for appointed counsel, the defendant must satisfy the court, after in-
quiry, that the defendant is "financially unable" to obtain counsel 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b).
" "[TIhe Act does not on its face violate the minimal right [to some counsel], nor
could it by any application other than one that included a follow-up refusal to appoint
any counsel." United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 922 (4th Cir. 1987).
- 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b).
" Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180
(1984); United States v. Ashe, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 US. 682 (1972).
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vices would be forfeitable. If the answer to fears about sixth
amendment protections is that the right to appointed counsel
adequately protects the defendant, then the defendant whose fu-
ture may rest with the success of the precharging efforts of the
lawyer may have no representation in the investigation simply
because the lawyer can predict that there will be a forfeiture
count. It may be narrowly correct to say that the right to counsel
has not been violated because the defendant has not yet been
charged. However, this position ignores the nature of federal
criminal practice in which some of the most effective and helpful
representation is provided before charging.6 2
Another criticism of the appointed counsel solution is the
effect it will have on the entire appointed counsel system. Fed-
eral defender organizations that might be appointed as counsel
have limited resources to handle the extensive investigation and
trial preparation involved in a complex RICO or CCE trial."
The drain on their resources may be compounded by the reluc-
tance of CJA panel lawyers in private practice, the other re-
source for appointment, to accept such cases. Most of these law-
yers are performing what is, in effect, a pro bono service and will
be committing significant time and effort to these often lengthy
and difficult cases.6 4
It is foreseeable that the future of the defense bar will be
jeopardized by this solution. If attorneys see that representing
their traditionally most lucrative clients may result in receiving
no greater fee than those provided by CJA rates, lawyers will
refuse such clients and move away from a criminal law speciali-
zation. If private attorneys are consistently forced into handling
assigned cases at CJA rates, they will stop accepting assign-
ments. If there is no future in a criminal law specialty, young
lawyers will not seek admission to local panels since the experi-
ence and contacts they would get would have no usefulness to
62 Forfeiture Hearings, supra note 7, at 231-32 (statement of Edward F. Marek,
Federal Public Defenders and Federal Community Defenders, Northern District of Ohio)
[hereinafter Marek Statement]. See also United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332,
1349-50 (D. Colo. 1985); K MANN. DEFENDING WmTs COLLAR CRIME 14-16 (1985).
'3 Marek Statement, supra note 62, at 233-38.
Current CJA rates barely compensate a private lawyer. The hourly rate is $60 an
hour for in court work and $40 an hour for time "reasonably" spent out of court, with a
cap of $2,000 for each attorney. The court may authorize payment exceeding the statu-
tory limit in particularly demanding cases. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d).
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their future practice. Thus, an entire segment of the bar would
vanish, leaving only publicly financed defender services.
Some courts already seem to believe the solution is to ap-
point, pursuant to the CJA, the same attorney who was sought
to be privately retained. This effectively holds the lawyer hos-
tage.6 5 These courts do a disservice in two ways - they force a
lawyer to work for inadequate compensation yet, by giving the
defendant the putative counsel of choice, undercut the sixth
amendment argument."6 To force the situation this way risks
creating hostility and resentment in the attorney-client relation-
ship and may cause serious ethical dilemmas. 7
As the sixth amendment arguments have been refined, the
denial of the absolute right to counsel has waned as a forceful
objection to fee forfeiture. Yet as long as the supposed safety net
is the appointed counsel system, a solution which fails to pro-
vide an adequate protection, that argument continues to have at
least practical, if not constitutional, value. 8
ii. Effective Assistance of Counsel
The qualified right to effective assistance of counsel is
grounded in a post-conviction analysis of prejudice and as such
is the weakest of all the sixth amendment arguments against for-
feiture.6 9 After conviction, the defendant who had to settle for
6 "A private attorney who attempts to devote a 40.hour week to CJA rates... to
the defense of a RICO or CCE case... simply will not be able to meet the office pay-
roll." Forfeiture Hearings, supra note 7, at 217 (remarks of Neal R. Sonnett, National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Figue-
roa, 645 F. Supp. 453, 456 (W.D. Pa. 1986). In Caplin & Drysdale, in which the lawyers
made a post-conviction application for release of funds, the government ironically argued
that the defendant was not denied his right to counsel of choice because his lawyer took
the gamble, represented him, then tried to recover his fee after conviction, exactly the
course the statute mandates. Brief for Petitioner at 35, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.) (No. 87-1729), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988)
[hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
Another approach is to release frozen funds to cover CJA costs. See United State3 v.
Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1401 (2d Cir. 1988).
67 See generally Uelmen, supra note 9 (discussion of Comprehensive Forfeiture Act
of 1984 in which ethical and tactical'implications of appointing retained counsel pursu-
ant to CJA were considered).
" "The available force of public defenders and legal aid lawyers is insufficient to
provide [the] assurance of [appointed counsel]." United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905,
921 (4th Cir. 1987).
69 The Supreme Court has articulated the ineffective assistance of counsel test*
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assigned or more modest counsel because his assets were re-
strained may well have been adequately represented under the
prevailing standard.70 In any event, the possibility that represen-
tation might be inadequate could not be litigated before trial.71
Therefore, this argument is not especially useful.
More substantial objections grounded in this aspect of the
sixth amendment are based more on the effect of forfeiture on
the attorney-client relationship. These perceived threats arise in
the context of several specific potential conflicts posed by forfei-
ture. First, since forfeiture is conditioned upon a conviction, an
attorney representing a client whose assets are in jeopardy may
be in the position of negotiating with the prosecution for a plea
that would salvage the fee, because only a negotiated disposition
could assure the fee; after a trial conviction the forfeiture is
mandatory. 2 The prosecutor even has the authority to negotiate
to exempt fees and to decide when and whose fees to forfeit.70
Lawyers may find themselves negotiating on behalf of their cli-
ents against their self-interest, or worse, to protect their fee
against the best interests of their clients.
Another ethical objection is the prohibition against contin-
gency fees in criminal cases.74 Since the attorney defending the
charges is also contesting the forfeitability of the assets needed
A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify
the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of
reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in
light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the
wide range of professionally competent assistance.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669, 690 (1984).
70 See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 666 (1984).
" Harvey, 814 F.2d at 922.
7' The court "shall" order forfeiture of any property that is the subject of a special
verdict. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c); 21 U.S.C. § 853(g). In fact, plea negotiations might even
result in a waiver of any claims a lawyer would have to the fees if, as in United States v,
Pemberton, 852 F.2d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1988), a defendant entered into a plea agree-
ment in a separate matter that provided for forfeiture of his property so that he relin.
quished his claim for release of assets to pay his present attorneys' fees. Indeed, in Cap-
tin & Drysdale itself, the government argues that the defendant's guilty plea consented
to the forfeiture of property named in the indictment so that the attorney's proper claim
is against the government at an ancillary hearing. Brief for the United States at 16-18,
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.) (No. 87-1729),
cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988).
7 Guidelines, supra note 10, § 9-111.700.
74 MoDEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY Rule 1.5(d)(2) (1981) (proposed
final draft); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(c) (1980).
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to pay the fee, the attorney's payment is dependent on the out-
come of the case. When advising the client, the lawyer has to
explain various options, one of which inures to the pecuniary ad-
vantage of the lawyer. Unless the government agrees to waive
forfeiture of a fee, a lawyer who wants to collect a fee may have
to try the case, a course of action that may conflict with the cli-
ent's best interests, because an acquittal is the only assurance of
securing the fee.
Other ethical dilemmas arise for lawyers when the govern-
ment pursues its discovery of forfeitable assets. Using subpoenas
to defense counsel, the government frequently justifies its quest
for information about fees paid or arranged as necessary to de-
termine the amount of funds potentially forfeitable. Although
information about fees generally is nonprivileged,7" the position
of a subpoenaed lawyer is unenviable because the attorney's tes-
timony assists the government and potentially creates a wedge
in the attorney-client relationship.
A final conflict for defense counsel occurs at the ancillary
post-conviction hearing. During the hearing, attorneys would
have to prove that they are bona fide purchasers with no reason
to be aware of the forfeitability of the assets used to pay their
fee. In order to meet this burden, attorneys may have to disclose
knowledge derived from the confidences of clients.76 Fear that
such confidences will be disclosed may have a chilling effect on
the willingness of clients to confide in defense counsel."
Although each of these claims have been echoed in critiques
of fee forfeiture, no court has been persuaded that such conflicts
alone impermissibly interfere with the quality or competence of
counsel so severely to warrant invalidation of the statute. How-
ever, the calculus of all of the claims must consider these possi-
ble harms to the attorney-client relationship as tipping the bal-
ance against upholding fee forfeiture. All of these possible levers
the government can employ to gain an even greater advantage
7' In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
76 "If [the attorney] made efforts to fight the forfeiture... the evidence on the
issue would consist primarily of privileged matter confided to him by his client." United
States v. Badalamenti, 614 F.2d 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
1 "The threat of an attorney having to disclose information obtained from his client
will chill the openness of those communications, thereby impinging on the right to coun-
sel." United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985). See aLso United
States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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over the defendant by either disqualifying or hobbling counsel
combine to harm the effectiveness of representation.
Although ineffective assistance of counsel claims are gener-
ally only reviewable on appeal after conviction, the same
prejudice analysis need not apply when evaluating the potential
damage. Even if a particular defendant has not suffered demon-
strable diminution of the quality of representation, giving the
government this power impermissibly affects the structure and
balance of the entire process and irreparably alters the strategies
and resources of the defense.
iii. Right to Counsel of Choice
As perceptions of the issues have sharpened, most courts
have identified the central sixth amendment issue to be whether
or not forfeiture of attorneys' fees violates a defendant's right to
retained counsel of choice, a qualified but nevertheless highly
protected aspect of the sixth amendment.78 As recently as 1988,
the Supreme Court gave great deference to this qualified right,
even while holding in the specific case that the right had not
been violated.79 In the past, the right has been qualified by such
relatively neutral principles as administrative concerns over de-
lay, lack of proper attorney licensing, or conflicts of interest. Al-
though the government occasionally makes disqualification ap-
plications, fee forfeiture cases represent an extreme example of
government initiated intrusion into the right of counsel of
choice. However, the paternalistic justification of protecting the
defendant against potential harm advanced in conflicts cases is
not even being asserted.
When the government restrains assets or threatens to seek
forfeiture of property otherwise available to pay attorneys' fees,
it proceeds unilaterally and with total discretion. Notwithstand-
ing careful supervision and assurances that fee forfeiture will be
sought only in cases in which there are "reasonable grounds to
believe the attorney had actual knowledge" that the particular
asset transferred was forfeitable,80 the effect of the decision to
78 The right to counsel implies the right to retained counsel of choice. See Urquhart
v. Lockart, 726 F.2d 1316 (8th Cir. 1984).
United States v. Wheat, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1697 (1988).
" See Guidelines, supra note 10, § 911.430. See also Forfeiture Hearings, supra
note 7, at 29 (statement of Stephen S. Trott, assistant attorney general); Guidelines,
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restrain substantial property is tantamount to denying the de-
fendant the opportunity to retain any counsel, whether first or
fifth choice. Few lawyers will risk undertaking a long and de-
manding commitment without the guarantee of payment. This
result is defended with the argument that a defendant has no
inherent right to use crime related assets to hire a lawyer." The
right to retained counsel of choice, it is argued, is always limited
by the ability to pay. Since forfeitable assets do not belong to
the defendant, the defendant has no greater claim to counsel of
choice than any other indigent individual.82
The government insists that pauperizing the defendant is
not improper for several reasons. First, they offer an analogy: if
a lawyer received the fruits of a car theft as payment, the lawyer
should not be permitted to keep them if the defendant were con-
victed of larceny since the lawyer's rights would not be superior
to the rights of the true owners.8 3 This analogy is flawed. First,
assuming that the car is identifiable, it is, if nothing else, evi-
dence of the crime and its very ownership is one of the elements
of the charge. Until the defendant is acquitted, the car would
not be at the defendant's disposal. Since the car's ownership is
in dispute, the need to preserve it intact in order to resolve own-
ership claims and to have it available as evidence in the trial
supersedes the defendant's claim at least temporarily. A convic-
tion factually establishes that the car does not belong to the de-
fendant. Moreover, the car is an easily traceable asset, probably
stolen recently and seized as evidence immediately after arrest.
In contrast, property forfeitable under RICO and CCE is not
necessarily stolen, and even if criminally generated, belongs to
the defendant. Furthermore, these assets include a wide variety
of items that, since forfeitability dates back to the commission
of the crimes charged, may have been converted, commingled, or
transferred to others. In any event, locating and identifying the
forfeitable property is hardly simple.8'
supra note 10, § 9-111.230.
" Brickey, supra note 9, at 533; In re Forfeiture Hearings as to Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 646 (4th Cir. 1988).
uMorris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) (The sixth amendment does not guarantee a
"meaningful relationship" between attorney and client.).
8Forfeiture Hearings, supra note 7, at 24.
This very problem prompted Congress in 1986 to permit forfeiture of substitute
assets up to the value of any forfeitable property that cannot be located, has been tran-
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In fee forfeiture cases, the government has no claim to the
property prior to the conviction other than one that arises by
creation of the statute, the assertion of which rests totally with
the government's charging discretion. Not only does the govern-
ment have the exclusive power to charge a crime that carries a
forfeiture penalty, it also can unilaterally decide to include a for-
feiture count and determine the scope of the forfeiture sought.
The government also argues that attorneys are not being
singled out; rather, any forfeitable property should be beyond
the reach of the defendant for any purposes. The analogy to
other economic deprivations that could be suffered by a defend-
ant whose assets are frozen is equally fallacious. First, there is
very little evidence that the government has objected to use of
forfeitable assets for other necessary expenses.8 5 This means ei-
ther that defendants who have no lawful assets with which to
hire a lawyer somehow have money to pay their other bills, or,
more likely, that forcing defendants to resort to medicaid or
foodstamps, as opposed to CJA counsel, is not a tactic the gov-
ernment ordinarily pursues.86 Second, and more importantly,
none of these other economic deprivations are constitutionally
protected. Ironically, the defense attorney again is in a disad-
vantaged position because of the attorney's inevitable knowledge
of the source of the fees.
Harvey was the first circuit court decision to focus on the
right to counsel of choice as the most appropriate frame for ana-
lyzing the sixth amendment claim, moving away from the less
supportable absolute right or effective assistance of counsel ar-
guments. As such, it provides a model example of the use of a
balancing test, weighing the government's articulated interests
ferred, is outside the court's jurisdiction, has been substantially diminished in value, or
has been commingled with property that cannot be divided without difficulty. See Pub.
L. No. 99-570, § 1153, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-13 (1986); 21 U.S.C. § 853(p); 18 U.S.C. §
1963(h).
"' In one case, the defendant was permitted to have sufficient assets unfrozen to pay
his federal and state taxes and $26,250 for living expenses despite the government's ob-
jection. United States v. Madeoy, 652 F. Supp. 371, 376 (D.D.C. 1987).
Be The dissenters in the en banc Monsanto decision attempted to distinguish be-
tween attorneys' fees and other necessities such as a grocer's bill or the costs of a medical
emergency, positing that funds would be released for medical or living expenses as a
matter of course without offering any principled reasons for the distinction. United




in fee forfeiture against this qualified, yet protected right. On
the government's side of the scale are its asserted interests in
preserving assets for eventual forfeiture and in stripping defend-
ants of their "economic power bases," including any economic
benefit gained from their crimes such as those provided by re-
tained counsel.87
In brief, the Harvey court, agreeing with the uncontroversial
proposition that only legitimate transfers of fees to lawyers
would be protected, acknowledged the fundamental, firmly
rooted assumption that an accused can use his property to
purchase legal assistance, even if these assets may eventually
prove to be the proceeds of crime.88 Even in a RICO or CCE
case, only those assets that can be connected to the crimes
charged are forfeitable. A defendant may well possess other
criminally derived property outside the scope of the forfeiture
count which can be used to pay counsel. No one interferes with
either this use of tainted assets or the use of indirect profits of
crime by a defendant in a non-RICO or CCE case to hire a law-
yer. The difference lies solely in the proof available to connect
the assets to the crimes and to indict for a RICO or CCE
offense. 9
Furthermore, the Harvey court acknowledged that retained
counsel generally will be able to provide a more effective defense
so that fee forfeiture may well affect the outcome of the case.
For example, in Harvey itself, appointed counsel, who happened
to be a partner of the original retained private attorney, at-
tempted to hire experts with CJA funds but these efforts were
largely rebuffed so that, according to their brief on appeal,
"[t]he preparation for trial bore no resemblance to the prepara-
tion that normally would and should, but could not, be under-
taken prior to a trial of this magnitude." 90
From the government's perspective, hiring an attorney of
choice is a benefit from criminal activities, like a fancy car or
house, that a defendant should not enjoy. Applying this argu-
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 192 (1984), reprinted in 1984 US. CoDn
CONG. & ArnnN. N.ws 3374, 3378-79.
" United. States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 924-25 (4th Cir. 1987).
" RICO, which by its elements subsumes other federal offenses and a variety of
serious state crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), has vastly increased the scope and impact of
forfeiture.
" Harvey, 814 F.2d at 912.
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ment to a lawyer's services is flawed because an attorney in a
criminal case is a necessity, not unlike food, clothing, and shel-
ter, particularly when the attorneys' skills are the very bulwark
between conviction and forfeiture on the one hand, and acquit-
tal and the retention of assets on the other. The illogic of this
position led one judge to say, "[E]quating the ability to raise a
defense to a 'benefit' of crime is like considering the right to a
jury trial a benefit of being accused of murder."91 To consider
retained counsel a benefit undercuts the government's position
that appointed counsel satisfies the sixth amendment require-
ment. By implication, if retained counsel is a benefit, then re-
tained counsel is somehow better than assigned counsel. This
bolsters the defense claim that because the resources and experi-
ence of assigned attorneys or public defenders are more limited
than those of retained lawyers, the representation is less effec-
tive. Without question the economic limits imposed by CJA re-
strict the other resources available such as experts or
investigators.
Unless it is sham payment, the defendant derives no actual
benefit other than the skills of the lawyer which, of course, ulti-
mately might lead to an acquittal. Presumably, the attorney
keeps the fee for services rendered and the defendant has no
more use of the property than if it had been forfeited. There is
some evidence that the government is deliberately pursuing
these claims against specific lawjers in order to dissuade partic-
ularly high-powered or successful attorneys from handling these
cases.92 Nevertheless, none of the cases in which forfeiture has
been sought contain any allegations of fraud or sham pay-
ments.93 There are several possible inferences to be drawn from
this pattern. First, by refusing to distinguish between legitimate
" United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1512 (10th Cir. 1988) (Logan, J.,
dissenting).
92 See Genego, New Adversary, supra note 6, at 809-10 tables 4 and 5 (Nationwide
.survey of 4,000 criminal defense attorneys revealed that attorneys in practice over ten
years or whose annual incomes exceeded $200,000 were more likely to have their fee
questioned. "Fee questioned" includes prosecutorial attempts to forfeit fees already paid
to an attorney as well as attempts to prevent the defendant from using assets to pay fees.
Id. at 806.).
03 Only in Long v. United States, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981), was there obvious
evidence of a sham transfer. A fugitive defendant's airplane was sold for cash represent-
ing a retainer for unperformed services, creating the inescapable inference that in this
transaction, the lawyers acted as a conduit for the defendant's money.
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and sham payments, the government overidentifies criminal de-
fense lawyers and their clients, implying that they are colluding,
if not as direct participants in criminal activity, at least as
knowing abettors. The lawyer hired by or on retainer to a known
crime figure conjures up an image of a partner in crime rather
than a detached advocate. The paucity of fee forfeiture in white
collar crime cases in contrast to narcotics prosecutions attests by
implication to the unstated but fairly obvious suspicions of a
particular species of defense lawyer.9' The lawyer for a drug
kingpin or organized crime figure is more likely to be seen as an
indispensable actor whose services are a benefit to the partici-
pants in the criminal activity. In contrast, lawyers representing
clients charged with "cleaner" economic and business crimes are
not viewed with the same suspicion.95
Another inference to be drawn from the government's dis-
sipation objection is that prominent criminal defense lawyers, by
charging substantial fees, certainly greater than CJA rates,
would reduce considerably the amount of assets available for
forfeiture.9 When the government speaks in terms of dissipa-
tion, it sounds like an assertion of an entitlement to the money
as if it were revenue. Although various funds were established in
1984 for utilizing forfeited assets, 7 the government's attitude
Recently, a small group of lawyers was called "a critical element in the life sup-
port system of organized crime." PRESMENT'S COMMISSION ON OcGNzzD CRm, MATERI-
ALS ON ETHICAL ISSUES FOR LAWYERS INVOLVED WITH ORGANIZED CRME CASES (1984). See
Taylor, Work of Lawyers of "Mob" Studied, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1985, at A24, col 3;
Lawyers Called Organized Crime "Life" Support, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 11, 1985, at 1, col 2.
g Many lawyers who identify themselves as "white collar crime" specialists work at
large firms or in smaller "boutique" practices, handling criminal legal matters of corpora-
tions or individuals in the business world. Many are former prosecutors. K. MNN, supra
note 62, at 19-34.
The example of dissipation usually invoked is described in the hearings con-
ducted in the House of Representatives in 1984. In a highly publicized prosecution of a
marijuana importation organization in Florida, which grossed approximately $300 million
dollars over a sixteen-month period, the government sought forfeiture of real property
worth $750,000, from which $559,000 was used to pay the defendant's attorne). After
paying $175,000 to the wife of one of the defendants, the government wound up with
$16,000. United States v. Meinster, No. 79-165-CR-JLK (S.D. Fla. 1979). This case, al-
though not the facts of forfeiture, is reported at 475 F. Supp. 1093 (S.D. Fin. 1979), a/rd
sub nom., United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1136 (1982). Rather than condemning the lawyer for charging exorbitant fees, the fault
in that case may have actually been the government's decision to seek forfeiture of only a
minuscule amount of the tainted profits.
9 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) provides that proceeds of the sale of property civilly or crimi-
nally forfeited be used to defray the costs of forfeiture or pay rewards for information
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suggests that paying the lawyer would deprive it of revenue on
which the budget depends. Certainly the kind of dissipation the
statute was intended to prevent was the transfer of assets to a
third party or the purchase of extraordinary or luxury items to
circumvent forfeiture. Fearing that nothing will remain after le-
gal fees are paid is a false issue because the government's claim
to the assets is not, unlike taxes, an entitlement. Rather, it de-
pends on a legal fiction that requires a condition precedent -
conviction - to be determined by the very adversary proceeding
for which counsel is required.
c. The Fifth Amendment Claim
At the very end of its opinion, the circuit court in Harvey
held that the procedures established by the 1984 CFA permit-
ting ex parte post-indictment restraining orders without a fur-
ther pretrial adversarial hearing violated the defendant Harvey's
fifth amendment right to procedural due process."'
The 1984 amendments created detailed proceedings for pro-
tective orders restraining potentially forfeitable assets to be is-
sued either before or after indictment. The procedures and stan-
dards filled in a gap created by the rather vague provisions of
the original RICO and CCE statutes. Prior to the 1984 CFA,
these statutes had authorized restraining orders after indict-
ment.99 However, since no standards or controlling procedure
was articulated, the statute invited procedural challenges. The
Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Crozier, initially held that
rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure required an im-
mediate hearing after an ex parte order had been entered.100
leading to the arrest and conviction of a person for the death or kidnapping of a federal
drug enforcement agent. See 28 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); note 18 supra.
98 814 F.2d at 929.
" For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) originally provided nothing other than, "In any
action brought by the United States under this section, the district courts shall have
jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders or prohibitions or to take such other actions,
including but not limited to restraining orders . . . in connection with any property or
other interest subject to forfeiture . .. ."
100 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982) (even with exigent circumstances, government may
not wait until trial to produce adequate grounds for forfeiture of property). Other courts
before the 1984 Act either followed or reached a similar conclusion to Crozier. United
States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1325 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994 (1985);
United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 616-19 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Long,
654 F.2d 911, 914 (3d Cir. 1981).
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While on petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated Cro-
zier for reconsideration.10 1 Before Crozier II was decided, the
1984 amendments had been enacted and were applied to the
case on remand.102
The 1984 CFA again failed to require a hearing after an ex
parte post-indictment restraining order, although the new act
contained specific procedures and standards for hearings when
pre-indictment protective orders issued.103 Thus, in the case of
any such order, neither a defendant's nor a third party's rights
in the property would be litigated from the time of indictment
until the time of an ancillary proceeding after conviction, an
event that could be months away. Instead of applying rule 65 to
fill the vacuum, Crozier II held that the new post-indictment
procedure violated the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment because it failed to provide for a hearing "at a meaningful
time" between the restraining order and the trial.0 '
In the legislative history of the 1984 CFA, Crozier I was
criticized for requiring the government to stage a mini-trial in
order to sustain the restraining order at which it would have to
prove the merits of the underlying case by bringing in witnesses
and disclosing evidence.10 5 In at least partial reaction to Crozier
I, Congress drafted the 1984 amendments specifically to differ-
entiate between pre- and post-indictment proceedings, requiring
an adversarial hearing in the former following an ex parte order,
but relying for the latter on the probable cause established by
the indictment. Justifying the absence of a hearing after indict-
ment, the senate report states that the indictment alone gives
adequate notice and that the need to prevent transfer or disposi-
tion justifies the ex parte nature of the proceeding.
A pre-indictment order can be obtained either upon notice
or ex parte. In the first instance, the government must later
prove at an adversarial hearing that there is a substantial
201 468 U.S. 1206 (1984), remanded for reconsideration on this issue in light of
United States v. $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555 (1983), which held that an eigh-
teen-month delay between seizure and petition for forfeiture in a civil case vas not a due
process violation.
"2 United States v. Crozier (Crozier II), 777 F.2d 1376, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1985).
103 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(B); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B).
101 Crozier II, 777 F.2d at 1383-84.
105 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 196 n.20 (1984), reprinted in 1934 US.
CODE CONG. & Avmmu. NEws 3379.
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probability that the property will be forfeited; that the defend-
ant will be convicted and the nexus between the criminal acts
and the property will be proven."' 6 In addition, the government
must demonstrate that an order is not only necessary to pre-
serve the property but that this need outweighs any hardship on
the defendant. An ex parte temporary order can also be ob-
tained before indictment on a showing of probable cause that
the property would be ordered forfeited and that notice to the
defendant would jeopardize its availability. 10 7 A temporary order
is effective for no more than ten days and may be challenged at
a hearing before its expiration.
In contrast, the restraint of property after indictment re-
quires no notice other than an indictment and no further proof
beyond the filing of the accusatory instrument.108 Therefore,
property alleged to be forfeitable can be restrained on a proba-
ble cause standard without any opportunity to contest the alle-
gation. Thus, the prosecutor in the grand jury totally controls
the decision of how much, if any, assets a defendant will have
available to pay the attorney.
Against this background, several courts, in addition to Har-
vey, have held that this provision violates the defendant's fifth
amendment due process rights. 109 Other courts have not found a
due process violation but have read a hearing requirement into
the statute when attorneys' fees are implicated, either because of
the special sixth amendment concerns,110 or because the statute
must be coupled with the standards of rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in order to satisfy procedural due pro-
cess concerns."' Whether constitutional or purely procedural,
106 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(B) & (2). This order is effective for ninety days unless
extended.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(2).
109 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(A); 21 U.S.C. § 853(d)(1)(A).
109 United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 729, reh'g denied, No. 87-1670 (7th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Unit 7 & Unit 8 (Kiser), 853 F.2d 1445, 1449-50 (8th Cir.
1988) (holding seizure of property needed to pay attorneys' fees pursuant to civil forfei-
ture action after ex parte finding of probable cause by a magistrate violated duo process
rights when no hearing held after seizure). But see United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d
1343, 1354 (1989) ("There is no bright line dictating when a post-restraint hearing must
occur."); United States v. Musson, 802 F.2d 384, 386-87 (10th Cir. 1986) (probable cause
sufficient to restrain property after indictment); United States v. Draine, 637 F. Supp.
482, 485 (S.D. Ala. 1986) (limiting Crozier to its facts).
"0 United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 82 n.7 (2d Cir. 1987).
.1. United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1468 (5th Cir. 1986), modified on denial o/
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the majority of courts have held the current version of the post-
indictment restraining order, without further proceedings or
higher standards, to be an inadequate basis for restraining
property.
d. The En Banc Decision
Harvey, which had consolidated Bassett and Reckmeyer,
was reheard en banc by the Fourth Circuit under the name
United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered (Reckmeyer). 12
The en banc court reversed the portion of the panel decision
based on sixth amendment grounds, finding no violation of the
right to counsel of choice."1 ' The decision dismissed cursorily
any violation of the basic right to counsel,11 4 identifying the only
sixth amendment right involved to be that of counsel of choice.
Limiting the right to counsel of choice to those defendants
with legitimate assets, the court analyzed the forfeiture count in
an indictment as "an assertion that the defendant does not have
the legal assets that entitle him to a right to counsel of choice in
the first place.' 1 15 By claiming ownership of the funds, a claim
asserted merely by convincing a grand jury that there is proba-
ble cause to believe the assets are forfeitable, and seeking to re-
strain them prior to trial, the government effectively cuts off the
defendant's use of the property for any purpose. Untroubled by
this consequence, the en banc panel also refused to credit any
argument that preconviction restraint of property was forbidden
by the presumption of innocence.1 '
reh'g, 809 F.2d 249 (1987).
112 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988).
" Id. at 643. The en banc court affirmed the panel's holding that the statute did
not exempt fees, id. at 641, and left undisturbed the panel's holding that the ex parte
post-indictment restraining order procedure violated the fifth amendment ("No such
procedural due process challenge is before us today."). Id. at 644.
." If the defendant is made financially unable to hire a lawyer because of a re-
straining order, "the defendant's right to representation will be protected by the ap-
pointment of counsel" Id. at 643.
::5 Id. at 644.
118 Id. at 643. It has always seemed excessively narrow to argue that preconviction
restraint was no more than a deprivation of property, thus only subject to procedural
due process analysis. If anything, the denial of counsel of choice interferes with the de-
fendant's liberty interest since the quality of advocacy available to the defendant may
well determine the outcome of the trial. Denial of counsel of choice is not the equivalent
of pretrial detention, as some courts have tried to analogize, cf. United States v. Nichols,
841 F.2d 1485, 1500-01 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
1989]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
2. United States v. Monsanto
a. The Panel Decision
The evolution of the Monsanto case was watched atten-
tively by the legal community since it was the first case challeng-
ing attorney fee forfeiture to be appealed to the Second Circuit.
It represented a fairly typical fact pattern in one of the busiest
and most influential federal prosecutor's offices in the country.
In this same district, two earlier decisions had been handed
down finding that, to the extent the statute could be construed
to include attorneys' fees, the legislature could not have in-
tended that result because of the obvious interference with the
sixth amendment right to counsel of choice.'1
In the district court, the government obtained a post-indict-
ment ex parte restraining order from which the defendant
sought to release some of his assets to pay the attorney of his
choice because he was functionally indigent without an unfreez-
ing of his funds. The court released only as much property as
was necessary to pay his counsel of choice at prevailing CJA
rates. Ultimately, he was assigned a lawyer who represented him
at the trial at which he was convicted on all counts and his prop-
erty was found to be the proceeds of his criminal activities." 8
On appeal from this ruling by the trial judge, the Second
Circuit agreed with Harvey that Congress did not intend an ex-
emption for legitimate attorneys' fees." 9 Again, reviewing the
(1987)), a regulatory measure of temporary duration designed to protect a public inter-
est. Nor is it persuasive that probable cause is a sufficient standard by which to subject a
defendant to restraints on liberty pending trial, see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 118-
19 (1975), since such restraint is temporary until final disposition. The harm done by the
restraint of assets is permanent if a defendant goes to trial without the attorney of
choice. Assuming the defendant is convicted, not only will the assets now belong to the
government, but also they will be unavailable to the defendant for any appeal of the
conviction, even one which challenges the very forfeitability of attorneys' fees or the
adequacy of the trial counsel. United States v. Friedman, 849 F.2d 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Thus, denial of the right to counsel of choice is a permanent harm that primarily affects
a liberty interest, the long-term imprisonment of a defendant. The maximum imposable
prison sentence for a RICO conviction is up to twenty years. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). For a
CCE conviction, a defendant faces a minimum of ten years up to a maximum of life. 21
U.S.C. § 848(a) & (b).
" United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), and United
States v. Ianiello, 644 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
"' Brief for the Petitioner at 8-9, 13, Unitpd States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d
Cir.) (No. 88-454), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
"' United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing United States v.
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available legislative history, the court not only refused to read
between the lines of the plain language of the statute, but also
chastised the earlier efforts of those district courts that had
avoided the constitutional issues by reading the statute to ex-
empt fees. The panel also considered and rejected the sixth
amendment right to counsel of choice claim, disagreeing with the
existing decisions.120 In language very similar to the later Fourth
Circuit en banc decision in Caplin & Drysdale, the court refused
to substitute "judicial policy for Congressional policy. 1 21
The Monsanto panel forged a compromise. Disinclined to
leave fee forfeiture entirely in the hands of the prosecutor, the
majority adopted a hearing procedure to review post-indictment
restraining orders that implicate attorneys' fees.1 22 At such an
adversarial proceeding, quickly dubbed a Monsanto hearing, the
government could not simply rely on the existence of the proba-
ble cause on which the indictment was based, but must establish
by independent evidence the likelihood that the assets are for-
feitable, in other words that the assets are the proceeds of the
criminal conduct charged.1 23
Although in Monsanto, no fees actually had been paid to
defense counsel, the court was concerned about the effect the
threat of eventual forfeiture might have on a defendant's ability
to secure retained counsel.1 24 Thus, the court exempted from fu-
ture forfeiture any assets left unrestrained after a pretrial hear-
ing. If an attorney feared that after conviction assets previously
Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 913-16 (4th Cir. 1987)).
120 Id. at 79-81. See United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 924 (4th Cir. 1937);
United States v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp. 1541, 1558 (D. Utah 1987). Both cases subse-
quently were reversed on this point. See United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th
Cir. 1988); In re Forfeiture Hearings as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637
(4th Cir. 1988) (reversing Harvey).
121 Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 81.
12 Id. at 82-84. Looking for authority to cases that invalidated the procedural as-
pects of the post-indictment restraining order, see Harvey, 814 F.2d at 928-29; Thier,
801 F.2d at 1466-70; United States v. Crozier (Crozier I), 777 F.2d 1376, 1382-84 (9th
Cir. 1985); United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1324-25 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Milburn v. United States, 474 U.S. 994 (1985), the court expressed a clear rule in
cases involving attorneys' fees that it hoped would survive any overruling of this line of
cases.
123 Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 84; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a).
11 Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 85. The attorney appearing for the limited purpose of
challenging the fee forfeiture entered a conditional appearance. Monsanto was repre-
sented by assigned counsel at trial. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1402 (2d
Cir. 1988) (en banc).
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unrestrained and actually disbursed had to be disgorged, there
would be no incentive to accept a case. This situation was not
present in Monsanto, in contrast to Caplin & Drysdale, in which
the government was seeking to recapture fees paid before the
entry of any restraining order. Nonetheless, the Second Circuit
addressed this highly possible hypothetical problem.
The court perceived that the greatest danger posed by for-
feiture is not the restraining order itself but the threat of forfei-
ture. Even if the government fails to meet its burden at the ad-
versarial hearing, an attorney fearful of possible conviction and
consequential forfeiture might well be deterred from handling
the case because of the uncertainty of any fee even if, pending
trial, the defendant has sufficient unfrozen assets."" The court
apparently saw this more generalized threat to the right to coun-
sel as greater than the risk in a case in which the government
has met its pretrial burden and the attorney, aware that the as-
sets are frozen, can judge the risks. This distinction, of course,
works to the advantage of the few defendants in the rare situa-
tion when the government's proof on the issue of forfeitability
cannot even meet a preponderance standard at an early point in
the proceeding but is sufficiently strengthened by the time of
trial to result in a conviction.
b. The En Banc Decision
The circuit remanded the case to the district court to hold a
hearing. At this hearing, the trial court ruled that the govern-
ment had met its burden of proving the likelihood that the as-
sets were forfeitable and left undisturbed the earlier restraining
order. The trial began with the defendant represented by ap-
pointed counsel.128
After a highly publicized and relatively rare en banc re-
view,1 27 a brief per curiam decision ordered that the restraining
"' Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 84.
126 All of the eighteen other defendants prosecuted by this indictment were repro-
sented by assigned counsel. The case lasted over one year from the date of the indict-
ment, July 8, 1987, to the date of entry of the judgment of conviction and sentence,
October 26, 1988. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 118, at 2, 13.
" Frost, Defense Bar Hails Monsanto Ruling, Manhattan Law., July 18, 1988, at 1,
col. 4; Sherman, Forfeiture Issue Still Unresolved, Nat'l L.J., July 18, 1988, at 1, col. 1.




order be modified to provide the defendant access to funds to
pay legitimate fees and held that to the extent that assets used
to pay fees are subsequently found forfeitable, they are forever
exempt.128 If Caplin & Drysdale epitomizes a structured linear
analysis of the statutory and constitutional issues, Monsanto is
actually three opinions 129 arriving at the confluence of the per
curiam holding. Each of the concurring opinions is based on a
different premise, yet each is informed by the same concern: the
impact of fee forfeiture on individual rights and the institutions
that protect them. This fragmentation unfortunately leaves the
Supreme Court without a forceful counterpoint to Caplin &
Drysdale. Despite the decision's lack of a uniform alternative
theory, its three approaches, in combination, provide powerful
reasons to invalidate this application of the statute.
i. The Statutory Rationale: Judge Winter
Until Monsanto, the standard statutory approach to fee for-
feiture analyzed the language of the statute and attempted to
determine the intent of the legislature regarding the exemption
of fees. Virtually every case, particularly circuit court cases de-
cided recently, have found no special exception for lawyers in-
tended by Congress. 130
Judge Winter looked at the statute itself from a totally new
perspective, supplying a fresh approach to argue for exclusion of
legitimate fees based on the equitable power of the trial court.131,
2 Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1402.
129 Id. (Feinberg, C.J., concurring); id. at 1404 (Oakes, J., concurring); id. at 1405
(Winter, J., concurring). There is a fourth, more narrowly reasoned rationale for reversal
Judge Miner's separate concurring opinion, in which he was joined by Judge Altimari,
expressed his view that while fifth amendment due process requires an adverary hearing
procedure, the creation of such safeguards is properly a matter for legislative rather than
judicial action, especially in light of strongly worded legislative history to the contrary.
Id. at 1411 (Miner, J., concurring) (citing S. Rws. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 195-96
(1984)).
130 See, e.g., United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988); In re Forfeiture Hearings as to Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988).
11 852 F.2d at 1405 (Winter, J., concurring). The appeal of this approach to the
statute was recognized by the petitioner in Caplin & Drysdale. Restructuring its statu-
tory claim, the brief argues for an interpretation of the statute that exempts attorneys
fees because the trial court has inherent equitable powers. Petitioner's Brief, supra note
66, at 11-33.
In United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986), modified on denial of reh'g,
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Referring to the very section of the senate report commonly
cited in support of the abandonment of a pretrial hearing if the
restraining order is obtained after indictment, 13 2 Judge Winter
found support for his view that the discretionary language of the
statute permits the court to modify or vacate a restraining or-
der.13s As long as the hearing is not conducted to contest the
merits of underlying indictment, the court has the power to bal-
ance the interests raised by continued restraint. Thus, the court
has the authority to release restrained assets to pay attorneys'
fees, even if such an order depletes the total amount of assets
available for forfeiture after conviction.
Since the third party protections were designed to avoid
hardship to innocent purchasers, the statute clearly contem-
plates at least the possibility that on occasion fewer assets even-
tually will belong to the government after conviction. Legitimate
payments to attorneys are simply another example of a possible
reduction of the full forfeitable amount.
Judge Winter's approach provides a convincing rationale for
exempting fees. Presumably, any exercise of the court's discre-
tion would require a hearing, whether formal or informal, at
which the interests of each side would be presented and
weighed. A particular case might present compelling reasons
why assets needed to pay counsel should remain frozen (the fees
are fraudulent, the fees are incontestably excessive), but the
government's typical blanket justifications for opposing the re-
lease of fees (fear of dissipation of assets and prevention of eco-
nomic benefit) would probably be insufficient without more spe-
cific allegations of harm to justify withholding funds to pay fees.
809 F.2d 249 (1987), the Fifth Circuit also found that the trial court had discretion to
decide whether and to what extent assets should be excluded from a restraining order so
that the defendant can pay living expenses, and reasonable attorneys' fees. 801 F.2d at
1470-71. Without directly construing the statute as Judge Winters did, the Fifth Circuit
remanded the case to the trial court to evaluate interests of the respective parties. Id. at
1475.
'32 "In contrast to the pre-indictment restraining order authority . . . the post-in-
dictment restraining order provision does not require prior notice and opportunity for a
hearing. The indictment or information itself gives notice of the government's intent to
seek forfeiture of the property . . . . This provision does not exclude, however, the au-
thority to hold a hearing subsequent to the initial entry of the order. . . ... S. REP. No.
225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 203 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG, & AnMIN, NEWS
3586.




Although a case-by-case determination may not be highly effi-
cient, the comparatively small cost to judicial administration is
worth the assurance of a fair trial.
If the fees are being paid for legitimate services, they are
not being "dissipated." Congress sought to avoid sham transac-
tions, not arms length transactions, when it enacted the relation
back provision to prevent the transfer of funds that would oth-
erwise defeat forfeiture.-" Nor is the defendant gaining a benefit
since the defendant is not keeping the assets. Instead, the lawyer
(or for that matter the grocer or dentist) is receiving remunera-
tion for services rendered. The only benefit a defendant is likely
to receive is more effective representation. If fee forfeiture is
permitted, the government may well face less expert or prepared
adversaries while destroying any incentives for lawyers to engage
in criminal defense work.135 Needless to say, these are not legiti-
mate arguments.
In contrast, the restraint of a defendant's assets needed to
pay a lawyer, or for other necessities as well, "irreparably im-
poses the economic impact of forfeiture before conviction." 130,
Although Judge Winter deftly avoided a constitutional analysis,
his worry about the irreparable harm of imposing a punishment
before conviction echoes the systemic concerns voiced by Judge
Oakes, while his reasoning and methodology resemble the bal-
ancing test promulgated by Chief Judge Feinberg.
ii. The Interplay of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments: Judge Oakes
In Judge Oakes's dissent in the original panel, he alluded to,
but did not develop, his particular constitutional analysis.'37 Al-
though he signed the concurring opinion of Judges Feinberg and
14 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 195 (1984), reprinted in 1984 US. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3378. The relation back provision was targeted to attempts to
"shield [assets] from any possibility of forfeiture." Id.
133 Fee forfeiture is not the only disincentive to accepting such cases. The increasing
use of "mega-trials" in which large numbers of defendants are charged in a single indict-
ment and which may last as long as a year also deters many practitioners. Rosenwein,
Testa Case Marks First Anniversary, Manhattan Law., Feb. 27, 1989, at 6, col 1.
"' Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1408 (Winter, J., concurring).
3 "The forfeiture statute, which permits the Government to recapture attorney.'
fees paid before conviction, is unconstitutional at least on Sixth Amendment, and posi-
bly Fifth Amendment due process, grounds." United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 87
(2d Cir. 1987) (Oakes, J., dissenting).
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Kearse, which is considered the "sixth amendment" view of the
case, in a separate dissenting opinion, Judge Oakes looked at
forfeiture as a systemic problem which "shakes the very founda-
tions of our criminal justice system."1"8
Although most opponents to fee forfeiture would argue their
points in the most neutrally legitimate terms, it is the powerful,
intuitive reaction to the threat posed to the whole criminal ad-
versary process that has been so disturbing from the first.
Rather than focus on the defendant's individual sixth amend-
ment rights, Judge Oakes argues institutional consequences. 3 ,
He reasons that the main role of defense counsel in the criminal
justice system - to provide vigorous representation 140 - is al-
tered permanently and irremediably when the prosecution is
permitted such a degree of control over the nature and quality
of the defense, essentially a fifth amendment concern.
Although it is doubtful that Judge Oakes's interweaving of
the two constitutional rights will explicitly influence the Su-
preme Court's consideration, this theme is heard repeatedly.1
4 1
And, because it goes to the heart of our assumptions about the
protections afforded by our system of criminal representation, it
will surely inform the Court. The Court should at least be im-
pressed by Judge Oakes's colorful allusion to Lewis Carroll,
"Pre-trial forfeiture. . . too closely resembles the Alice-in-Won-
derland queen's 'sentence first, verdict afterward' mode of
Justice. 1 4 2
138 Id.
" Id. at 86-87. For the most comprehensive and well-reasoned examination of this
view, see Cloud, Forfeiting, supra note 9, at 3.
"I Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1404-05 (Oakes, J., concurring). See Penson v. Ohio, 109
S. Ct. 346, 352 (1988) (importance of vigorous representation to adversarial system).
14 United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1477 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concur-
ring) ("The Government should not be permitted to cripple the defendant at the outset
of the struggle by depriving him of the funds he needs to retain counsel . ... "), modi-
fied, 809 F.2d 249 (1987); United States v. Estevez, 645 F. Supp. 869, 871 (E.D. Wis,
1986) ("[T]o allow the government the power to force all drug defendants to have court
appointed lawyers gives the government unseemly control over who its adversaries wil
be."), rev'd sub nor., United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, reh'g denied, No. 87.
1670 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985)
("The government would possess the ultimate tactical advantage of heing ahle to exclude
competent defense counsel as it chooses. By appending a charge of forfeiture to an ill-
dictment ...the prosecutor could exclude those defense counsel which he felt it be
skilled adversaries."). See also United States v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp. 154.1. 559) n.,23 (I).
Utah 1987). r'cvd. 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988). Se' gen'rally Genego. I'mrsccahtol
Ccnlrol. supro note 6.
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iii. The Sixth Amendment Violation: Chief Judge Feinberg
A three-judge concurring opinion, authored by Chief Judge
Feinberg, applied a balancing test to determine if the govern-
ment's interest in fee forfeiture outweighs the right to counsel of
choice, "a fundamental right that serves to protect other consti-
tutional rights.. 14
3
Rather than conclude that a defendant's right to counsel of
choice is coterminous with the defendant's legitimate assets,
thus necessitating no weighing of comparative harms, this bal-
ancing test assumes the right to hire counsel of choice even with
tainted assets if the government's interests do not outweigh
sixth amendment guarantees. The factors weighed on either side
of the scale were quite similar to those assessed by Judge Winter
in his equitable power analysis. On the government's side are the
three goals frequently cited: the preservation of assets for forfei-
ture, the destruction of the economic base of the criminal, and
deterrence. Each of these claims indiyidually or in combination
is insufficient, according to Chief Judge Feinberg. Although it
may be valid to attempt to thwart transfers intended to circum-
vent forfeiture, payment of legitimate fees has no such motive.
The economic resources of the defendant required to secure re-
tained counsel is a minor aspect of the presumed interests accu-
mulated from criminal activity. In any event, the defendant does
not have the benefit of his assets after conviction whether they
are simply turned over to the government or they are paid to
counsel. Finally, deterrence is served by the general and sub-
stantial threat posed by forfeiture as punishment.
To the concurring judges, the true harm is the preconviction
deprivation of funds with which to contest the very charges that
may cost defendants their freedom and their forfeitable assets.
Calling the government's interest "not all that compelling,"'144
Chief Judge Feinberg finds the cost to the defendant and the
adversarial system far surpasses the "small societal cost" of al-
lowing a defendant to use tainted assets to mount a defense.
14 0
.4- 852 F.2d at 1404 (Oakes, J., concurring).
143 Id. at 1402 (Feinberg, C.J., with whom Oakes & Kearse, JJ., join, concurring).
144 Id.
145 Id. at 1403.
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iv. Some Agreement Among the Concurring Opinions
The original panel decision established a post-conviction ex-
emption for fees actually paid to a lawyer when the government
had failed to sustain its burden at a pretrial adversarial hear-
ing.146 This view was expanded by the per curiam decision to
protect an attorney from disgorging any fees actually paid out of
unrestrained or released assets for that purpose even if, after
conviction, they are ordered forfeited.14 7 The panel referred only
to assets about which the government failed to sustain its bur-
den at a pretrial hearing, while the per curiam decision refers to
any unrestrained assets. The slight difference between these two
positions is procedural, not philosophical, since both recognize
how the threat of post-conviction forfeiture requiring the recap-
ture of fees already paid could deter the most dedicated defense
counsel. Despite this procedural distinction, a majority of the en
banc court, including the dissenters, agree in principle that the
threat of post-trial recapture of fees actually paid from unre-
strained assets later ordered forfeited would limit the right to
counsel of choice even more harshly than the initial refusal to
release funds altogether. 148
II. WHAT WILL THE SUPREME COURT DECIDE?
Captin & Drysdale and Monsanto call for the Supreme
Court to be not only principled but also pragmatic. The two
cases, in combination, provide the Court with every factual per-
mutation as well as the panoply of statutory and constitutional
challenges. In Caplin & Drysdale, the lawyers were actually paid
a portion of their fee before the assets were restrained and, after
conviction, were attempting to retain that amount as well as re-
lease forfeited assets in payment for the rest of their services. In
Monsanto, the post-indictment protective order withheld from
the defendant all of his available property. Given these different
settings, the Court will be able to consider the factual variations
of pretrial restraint as well as post-conviction disgorgement and
claims for fees.
'4' 836 F.2d at 84.
852 F.2d at 1402.
48 Judge Pratt believed that this particular issue was not ripe for review in this case
because Monsanto had no unrestrained funds to use to pay a lawyer. Id. at 1420-21
(Pratt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Although attempting to predict the decisions of the Su-
preme Court is risky business indeed, one way to avoid the
stigma of an incorrect prophecy is to foretell one result while
wishing and providing arguments in support of another.
A. Statutory Construction
The legislative history of RICO and CCE direct that the
statutes be "liberally construed to effectuate [their] remedial
purposes.14 9 In order to find an exemption for fees, the Su-
preme Court would have to read into the language of the statute
a specific intent to treat fees differently from other payments to
third parties. Since the forfeiture penalty is one of the most
powerful and innovative tools of these statutes, and the relation
back doctrine was added in 1984 to strengthen this remedy, it is
almost unthinkable that the Supreme Court will construe the
statute to add language that does not appear on its face. 150
Judge Winter's concurring opinion in Monsanto offers an el-
egantly simple solution for the Court to interpret the statute
broadly as creating no special treatment for lawyers while essen-
tially acknowledging and even deferring to the compelling equi-
table and practical arguments against fee forfeiture. The "equi-
table discretion" approach avoids constitutional pronouncement
and does not alter the structure of the statute at all. By finding
in the very language of the statute the authority to release assets
before trial to pay legitimate, and presumably reasonable, law-
yers' fees, Judge Winter's equitable approach nevertheless mea-
sures the relative harms to both sides on a case-by-case basis.
Actually, his view suggests that assets required for fees generally
will be released because preconviction restraint on a defendant's
access to funds to pay for legal representation on a criminal
"I Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922,
947 (1970); 21 U.S.C. § 853(o).
1" This conclusion is supported by the Court's unwillingness in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Iinrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985), to read into the civil remedy available under RICO, 18
U.S.C. § 1964, a requirement that a private plaintiff may only proceed against a defend-
ant who has previously been convicted.
Furthermore, in 1988 Congress failed to enact an attorneys' fees exception to these
statutes when it added language to the money-laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1957(0(1)
(Supp. IV 1986), to exclude from the definition of monetary transaction "any transaction
necessary to preserve a person's right to representation as guaranteed by the sixth
amendment to the Constitution." Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §
6182, 102 Stat. 4181, 4354 (1988).
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matter, an "ordinary lawful expenditure," is imposing a punish-
ment.151 This creates a functional exception for fees unless the
government can raise a particularized objection to the release of
assets.
Although forfeiture after conviction is mandatory, the gov-
ernment's title to the property is conditional until a special ver-
dict of forfeiture is entered. Even if a pretrial hearing were to
establish a substantial probability of forfeitability, the outcome
of the trial is still speculative. A reading of the protective order
provisions of the statutes to authorize the court to evaluate the
competing claims of the defendant and the government to the
funds needed for ordinary, reasonable expenses, including fees,
does not unduly interfere with the government's right to its po-
tentially forfeitable property. Flexibility and sensitivity to both
parties can hardly be condemned as an undesirable outcome.
Prohibiting a balancing of the equities, especially in light of the
government's merely qualified claim, interferes with the funda-
mentally fair proceeding that is the basic guarantee of the sixth
and fifth amendments. 152
By construing the statute to give the trial court the power
to release funds from pretrial restraint and, by implication, from
post-conviction forfeiture, the Supreme Court could establish a
de facto method for supervising fees so that excessive expendi-
tures will not unduly deplete the assets available for forfeiture.
The absolutist interpretation by some courts of this discretion-
ary pretrial power will cease if a standard of necessity and rea-
sonableness is applied by the trial court. The court's view of the
market place will undoubtedly be informed by the legal commu-
nity's norms for handling cases of comparable complexity and
duration.
This position is a compromise between an unfettered free
market approach to the determination of a fee by the lawyer and
client and a uniform cap on fees limited to the current CJA
rates.15 3 The term "legitimate fees" implies more than non-
"' United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1408 (2d Cir. 1988) (Winter, J.,
concurring).
5 2 "[T]he purpose of providing assistance of counsel 'is simply to ensure that crimi-
nal defendants receive a fair trial.'" Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1696-97
(1988) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
M' In an interesting commentary, Professor G. Robert Blakey posed the question
about attorney fee forfeiture in a very different form: "How shall legal fees be deter-
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fraudulent; it means reasonable and for genuine value. Judge
Winter's approach permits greater judicial oversight than pres-
ently takes place over fee arrangements and their relationship to
the total amount of forfeitable property while fairly balancing
the competing interests without requiring a pronouncement of a
constitutional role.
B. Right to Counsel of Choice
As these two cases ascended to the Supreme Court, the need
for a constitutional pronouncement has been largely assumed in
light of the almost universal refusal to exempt fees on statutory
grounds.'M The very organization of most cases has evolved so
that first the legislative history is examined and then, having de-
clined to read the statute as requiring an exemption, the consti-
tutional claims are examined. After the early cases which
blended a statutory and constitutional analysis, the right to
counsel of choice has emerged as the key potential constitutional
violation.
To find that fee forfeiture violates this right, the Supreme
Court would have to repudiate the logic that "[t]he right to
counsel of choice belongs only to those with legitimate assets"""'
and further find that the relation back doctrine creates an im-
permissible preconviction interference with the right to counsel
because it effectively determines the defendant's punishment,
deprivation of his assets, before trial. Furthermore, the creation
of an exemption in RICO and CCE cases would have the appear-
ance of creating a special category of defendant with perhaps
even greater entitlements than others, an ironic result consider-
ing the magnitude and antisocial nature of the crimes charged. 00
mined in our society?" He suggests three possibilities: the free market, political decision
(appointed counsel or public defenders), or the judiciary. Blakey, supra note 9, at 781-82.
I" Cf. United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1350 (11th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1496 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905,
918 (4th Cir. 1987).
' In re Forfeiture Hearings as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 645
(4th Cir. 1988).
15 "It is hard to conceive of a legal system in which appointed counsel is routinely
adequate in a death penalty case, but is somehow inadequate in a case involving 'the
career criminal millionaire who purchases cars, businesses, and real estate with cash de-
livered to banks in suitcases."' Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1507 (quoting Forfeiture of Narcot-
ics Proceeds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980) (statement of Sen. Biden)).
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Traditional analysis dismissing the claim that fee forfeiture
violates the defendant's right to retained counsel of choice sim-
ply concludes that this right is limited by the economic purchas-
ing power of the defendant's legitimate assets. In contrast,
courts holding that fee forfeiture violates this right tend to em-
ploy a balancing test instead.15 7 Once such a test is the basis for
deciding the validity of fee forfeiture, the government's justifica-
tions do not prevail. The Supreme Court has the Monsanto con-
curring opinion authored by Chief Judge Feinberg as well as the
Harvey and Thier circuit court decisions for support if it
chooses to reach the same result.
However, these decisions really do no more than state the
conclusion of their weighing process. To fortify this methodol-
ogy, the Supreme Court should examine the gestalt of the oppo-
sition to fee forfeiture, as articulated by Judge Oakes's concerns
about the aggregate affect fee forfeiture has on the established
order of conducting the criminal trial process.
First, in making its decision the Court must not ignore the
impact its decision will have on the criminal justice system. If
the Court upholds fee forfeiture, concluding that nothing in the
Constitution gives special protection to the proceeds of criminal
activities, the result will deal a serious blow to entrenched per-
ceptions of the role of defense counsel and will cause chaos to
the administration of the criminal justice system. By effectively
dragooning lawyers into appointments on lengthy trials and in-
evitably restructuring the appointed private counsel and public
defender systems, this decision could dramatically alter existing
institutions158 This prediction is controversial: claims that for-
157 "We do not believe that these powerful, constitutionally secured individual inter-
ests - grounded in root assumptions of our adversarial system - are outweighed in the
constitutional balance by the asserted governmental interests in deterrence, in preserv-
ing property for forfeiture, and in depriving convicted persons of their economic bases
for further criminal activity." Harvey, 841 F.2d at 925. See also Monsanto, 852 F.2d at
1402 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring).
188 Most appointed lawyers are either experienced private counsel who tithe some of
their time to a certain number of cases a year or are novices seeking to acquire experi-
ence and earn reputations that will bring them business. Neither group will have any
incentive to take these cases or, for that matter, to continue to specialize in criminal
defense. Furthermore, the situation is compounded by the complexity of RICO and CCE
cases, often requiring so-called "mega-trials" that drain the time and resources of re-
tained lawyers. Margolin, supra note 6, at 812; Lefcourt & Horwitz, The RICO Era:
Megatrials, Megaproblems and Megabucks, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 1988, at 1, col. 3.
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feiture as well as other practices have deterred lawyers from ac-
cepting retained cases have been asserted,"" as well as repudi-
ated,16 0 while concerns over the abilities and resources of federal
public defender services have been expressed 161 and dismissed as
unjustified or insulting.1 62
This systemic threat is a very real consequence of a decision
upholding the constitutionality of fee forfeiture. No doubt many
lawyers who have been active in litigating these issues 6 s or who
have represented clients despite personal financial hardships'"
may well discontinue their involvement in such cases after a de-
finitive ruling giving the government almost unsupervised power
to seek restraint of assets otherwise needed for fees.
The fundamental, and at times almost inarticulable,6 5 over-
all objection to fee forfeiture is really the sum of its pieces. By
interfering with choice of counsel, by impinging on the strategies
of the defense and limiting its resources, by permitting the con-
sequences of the sentence to occur before a conviction, and most
of all, by allowing all of this to happen as a result of a unilateral
exercise of power by the prosecutor at such an early stage of the
proceedings, the statute impermissibly alters the contours of the
adversarial process .16 Even if narcotics traffickers and racke-
159 Genego, New Adversary, supra note 6, at 804-15; Genego, Risky Business, supra
note 6, at 7.
160 Forfeiture Hearings, supra note 7, at 64 (letter from John R. Bolton, assistant
attorney general to Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (July 9, 1986)).
261 Id. at 225-41 (Marek statement).
162 Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1507; Bolton Letter, supra note 33, at 64-67; Brickey, Im-
pact, supra note 9, at 521.
1'3 For example, Edward M. Chikofsky, attorney of record for Monsanto on his ap-
peals to the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court, presumably has been handling this
case in order to fully litigate the issues since the defendant was represented by other
appointed counsel at his trial Other active amici curiae have included the National As-
sociation of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the National Network for the Right to Counsel,
and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
16 The law firm of Caplin & Drysdale has been litigating on behalf of its own fees
amounting to $195,000 ($25,000 in fees held in escrow;, $170,000 in unpaid fees). Caplin
& Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 641.
165 As the Harvey court said:
Certainly this is a traditional working assumption [in-gotten gains may be used
by defendants to retain private counsel even if they are later found guilty]
within the legal profession and one so firmly grounded that it may well explain
the incredulity of some district judges and the organized bar that Congress
could possibly have intended effectively to undercut it.
Harvey, 814 F.2d at 925.
I One court vividly characterized this scenario as a "preemptive strike." United
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teers deserve no special treatment or protection, the sixth
amendment's guarantees extend to the guilty as well as the inno-
cent defendant,. and to the guilty drug kingpin or organized
crime figure as well as the drunk driver or thief.
A Supreme Court searching for a sixth amendment jurispru-
dence could easily adopt the narrow view of the right to counsel
of choice exemplified by Caplin & Drysdale. If, instead, the
Court is troubled by the harm to the individual and the criminal
justice system, the justices can look to the Monsanto concurring
opinions for support in fashioning a particularized balancing test
that would assume that a defendant's right to counsel of choice
outweighed the government's interests in these assets specifi-
cally, or in the forfeiture penalty generally, unless a demonstra-
ble need to restrain the property existed in the individual case.
C. Procedural Due Process
A consensus has formed among courts considering the pro-
cedural adequacy of the post-conviction protective order provi-
sions. These courts, including the Monsanto panel as well as
both Harvey and Caplin & Drysdale, find the absence of a post-
restraint pretrial adversary hearing to violate fifth amendment
due process guarantees.8 1
It is quite possible that this issue will be deferred by the
Supreme Court because neither case actually presents this ques-
tion for the Court's review. 16 In fact, the government opposes a
hearing requirement, preferring the ex parte probable cause
standard. 69 For the defendant, a hearing represents a position
of retreat, which would be required only after a failure to prevail
States v. Unit 7 and Unit 8 (Kiser), 853 F.2d 1445, 1451 (8th Cir. 1988).
107 See notes 98-111 and accompanying text supra.
1"8 In Caplin & Drysdale, the Fourth Circuit did not reconsider the fifth amend-
ment aspect of the Harvey holding. In Monsanto, the hearing procedure established by
the panel was overturned by the en bane court. See United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d
1400, 1402 (2d Cir. 1988).
169 The government stated in its brief:
There is no occasion here for the Court to consider the correctness of the
panel's decision insofar as it held that an adversarial hearing is required in
order to maintain a restraining order that has the effect of preventing the de-
fendant from using the restrained assets to hire a lawyer. . . . [W]e have seri-
ous doubts that the Constitution requires an adversarial hearing. A judicial
determination of probable cause. . . should be sufficient ....
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 118, at 43-44.
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on the central substantive constitutional claims.1 70
Any ruling by the Court that the statute either exempts fees
or violates the sixth amendment will obviate the need to resolve
whether a hearing is required, at least when attorneys' fees are
implicated by the seizure of assets. Even if the Court upholds
the application of the forfeiture provisions of RICO and CCE to
attorneys' fees, the justices may choose to postpone considera-
tion of the procedural due process since the issue is not directly
before the Court.
If the Court decides to expand its ruling to consider the
post-indictment restraining order procedures, it could comment
narrowly or broadly. Rather than invalidate the existing proce-
dures, the Court simply could express reservations about the ab-
sence of a hearing. Since the current procedures apply to all
post-indictment seizures, including general funds or assets
needed for other necessary expenses, the Court may resist creat-
ing a rule mandating a hearing in order to avoid a widespread
rule. Or the Court could adopt the Monsanto panel approach
requiring a hearing whenever attorneys' fees are involved, rele-
gating the due process question with respect to other assets for
later consideration. It is unlikely the Court will invalidate the
statute entirely because it lacks such a hearing unless the Court
embraces the view that writing a hearing requirement into the
statute would be impermissible judicial activism.171
If the Court mandates a pretrial adversarial hearing after
entry of a post-indictment restraining order, it will also have to
determine a burden of proof for the government to meet since
the statute is silent. Several possibilities exist. In the pre-indict-
ment portion of the statute, the government must demonstrate
the "substantial probability that the United States will prevail
on the issue of forfeiture."' 2 The Monsanto panel applied a
lesser standard, requiring a showing of a mere "likelihood" of
170 In the district court argument, Monsanto's attorney pro tern argued for a hearing
as a "possible solution," but the issue was not raised by this attorney on the original
appeal to the Second Circuit. Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 82 n.6.
7 This was the position advanced by Judges Miner and Altimari in their dissent in
Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1411 (Miner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
also Amicus Brief of the Committees on Criminal Advocacy and Criminal Law of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York at 19-22, United States v. Monsanto, 852
F.2d 1400 (2d Cir.) (No. 88-454), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988).
17-2 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(B)(i); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B)(i).
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success.1 73 Of course, at the trial itself, the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the assets are forfeitable,
an unjustifiably heavy burden to impose at a pretrial hearing
unless the government essentially conducts a mini-trial of the
case, a proceeding that is generally disfavored in other contexts.
A possible middle standard requiring clear and convincing
evidence may be most appropriate since the liberty, interest at
stake if the defendant is convicted without representation by
counsel of choice should require more than a showing of a mere
preponderance of the evidence. The consequences of restraint
are more closely analogous to civil commitment or deportation
proceedings, which have required a clear and convincing
standard.1 4
Since none of the parties in either case have explicitly
raised the hearing issue, and because the Court would have to
act as a legislature in order to adopt and define such a require-
ment, it may well decline to speak on this issue. However, if the
Court is impressed by the unanimity and consistency of the rul-
ings of the circuit courts, it may take the initiative to "fix" the
statute.
III. PROPOSED STATUTORY CHANGES
If an exemption is read into the statute or if fee forfeiture is
held unconstitutional, courts presumably could administer the
provisions of the statute by carving out an exception for legal
fees. If no statutory exclusion or constitutional infirmity is found
to exist, Congress should complete the task undertaken in 1986
and revise the statute to exclude fees.
The case for legislative reform is based on a public policy
argument: fair treatment for a criminal defendant requires inde-
pendent counsel to preserve the "balance of forces between the
accused and his accuser."'77 The fundamental principle that
must be articulated in any statutory revision is that legitimate
reasonable attorneys' fees are not subject to forfeiture. Modifica-
tions to achieve this goal would dispel an unfortunate, destruc-
"7 Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 82.
'M' Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (civil commitment); Woodby v. Immi.
gration and Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (grounds for deportation must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence).
,75 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
(Vol. 55: 111
FEE FORFEITURE
tive development caused by this legislation that treats criminal
defense attorneys and their clients as if their interests were
identical, a view that erodes the fundamental moral neutrality of
the sixth amendment's guarantee of counsel to any individual
without regard to guilt or innocence or the character of the
charge.
In order to express an exemption for legitimate reasonable
attorneys' fees, the current legislation could be amended in three
areas: the relation back doctrine, the protective orders, and the
ancillary hearings. Each section should be changed not only to
conform in principle, but to systematically establish consistent
procedures.
A. The Relation Back Doctrine
The relation back doctrine should specifically exempt attor-
neys' fees in such language as "Otherwise forfeitable property
which has been paid, transferred, assigned, is contracted for, or
is owed to an attorney in payment for past or future legitimate,
reasonable attorneys' fees in connection with a prosecution of a
violation of [RICO or CCE] shall be exempt from forfeiture."
This exemption establishes that payment for any represen-
tation, even that occurring before the right to counsel has at-
tached, is guaranteed. Thus, the fear that the threat of forfeiture
will discourage lawyers from accepting employment, especially at
a stage when appointed counsel is not assured, would disappear.
By limiting the exemption to reasonable attorneys' fees, the
new version attempts to assuage the government's worry that
fees will drain forfeitable assets. The "Rolls-Royce of [defense]
attorneys"17  may charge a seemingly exorbitant fee, but the ser-
vices and skills may amply justify the amount. There are, in any
event, several civil analogues by which the court can determine
if that fee is reasonable.Y By referring to customary community
standards for handling cases of the complexity and duration that
RICO and CCE cases command, as well as to the experience and
qualifications of the particular attorney, the court should be able
to supervise the fee.
176 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2, 1985, 605 F. Supp. 839,
850 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
177 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1978); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) 22 U.S.C. § 1415
(1982); (all allowing prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees for violation).
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In civil settings, prevailing parties normally submit contem-
poraneous records of their time and expenses. Some defense at-
torneys might protest such record keeping, especially if the fee
has been calculated for the entire case rather than on an hourly
basis, arguing that the fee is a matter of private contract. How-
ever, since the government has a proprietary interest in the
amount of the forfeiture, particularly after conviction, protests
to such record keeping or fee review would not be very credible
or very professional. The mechanisms for determining the rea-
sonableness of a fee should largely depend on the standard prac-
tice in the community in which the lawyer practices or in which
the case is being prosecuted.
B. Protective Orders
An explicit exemption of fees eliminates the need for com-
plicated litigation of protective orders. This approach reforms
existing law that seemingly treats attorneys' fees as any other
bona fide transaction but, in fact, singles them out for harsher
treatment because of the requirement of ignorance of the illicit
source of the payment. Instead, release of funds for payment
would be automatic after court review unless the government
objects, questioning the legitimacy or reasonableness of the fees.
Naturally, nonforfeitable untainted assets must be the first
source for payment of fees. Until legitimate funds are exhausted,
the court should not order the release of forfeitable property.
However, if the court reviews the defendant's financial situation
and determines that insufficient nonforfeitable property exists
from which the fee can be paid, funds should then be released
promptly so that counsel can be retained as soon as possible.
Preconviction restraining orders will still be necessary to
preserve the potentially forfeitable property. However, since the
statute now entitles the lawyer to the fee, the court must ini-
tially or periodically release sufficient assets to compensate the
attorney for services provided and expenses incurred in the
preparation of the case. If the defendant is convicted, once the
court has reviewed the reasonableness of the fee, the balance
should be released from either the frozen assets or from other
assets found forfeitable after conviction. This review should not
attempt to second-guess strategical choices by the defense that
may have incurred expenses. Instead, the court should give great
latitude to the attorneys' claims for expenses and costs.
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Since attorneys no longer have the burden of proving that
they are bona fide purchasers for value, concerns about the lack
of procedural due process provided in the existing statutory pre-
trial hearing would be moot. Presumably, the court's determina-
tion to release assets would not even require an adversary pro-
ceeding unless the government chose to contest the reason-
ableness or legitimacy of the fee.
C. Post-Conviction Review
Following entry of an order of forfeiture under this section,
a bona fide purchaser must now petition the court for a determi-
nation of rights in the property. Any third party claiming a right
to forfeitable property must petition the court for a hearing to
adjudicate the validity of this claim. The petition must demon-
strate by a preponderance of the evidence a superior right or
title to the property and, as a bona fide purchaser for value, the
absence of any reasonable belief that the property was forfeita-
ble.178 Since the proposed statute exempts reasonable attorneys'
fees from forfeiture, a post-conviction ancillary hearing to adju-
dicate attorneys' fees would largely be unnecessary except per-
haps if the lawyer is trying to establish entitlement to a greater
.fee than the court had previously allowed.
No court or commentator has suggested that fraudulent or
sham transfers of property to an attorney disguised as fees
should be insulated from forfeiture. The fear that attorneys' fees
will be used to launder money for its eventual return to the de-
fendant is valid. The government, therefore, should be able to
challenge the legitimacy of the fees when collusion or other im-
propriety is suspected. In light of the seriousness of a claim al-
leging criminal, quasi-criminal, or unethical misconduct by the
lawyer, the government should have to meet a high standard of
proof by clear and convincing evidence that the fees were illegit-
imate before a fee can be disgorged. 79 This reflects the more
178 18 U.S.C. § 1963; 21 U.S.C. § 853.
,79 When allegations of moral turpitude or quasi-criminal conduct are the basis of
civil criminal claims, frequently a higher standard of proof is required. Knaebel v.
Heiner, 663 P.2d 551, 553 (Alaska 1983) (breach of fiduciary duty sustained by dear and
convincing evidence); In re Swartz, 129 Ariz. 288, 294, 630 P.2d 1020, 1025 (1981) (evi-
dence of professional misconduct must be clear and convincing); Medoff v. State Bar of
California, 71 Cal. 2d 535, 545, 455 P.2d 800, 807, 78 Cal. Rptr. 696, 706 (Ca. 1969)
(requiring convincing proof to a reasonable certainty in attorney disciplinary proceed.
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trusting belief that the attorney who engages in a sham transac-
tion is exceptional and that such a serious allegation by the gov-
ernment should require proof of the attorney's actual intent to
disguise fees as payments for other purposes, such as money
laundering. Negligence or a failure to inquire should be an insuf-
ficient basis for losing the fee. The ancillary hearing provisions,
therefore, should be revised to authorize the government to peti-
tion for the return, remission, or reduction of the fees.
CONCLUSION
Very soon the Court finally will express its views about this
controversy. In the eyes of some commentators, fee forfeiture is
only one of the new tools available to and used by the govern-
ment to reform the core of federal criminal law at the expense of
traditional, highly valued institutions. The Court's decision may
establish some limits to this power or at least motivate legisla-
tive reform.
POSTSCRIPT
The portion of Monsanto which contains the fullest expres-
sion of the Court's statutory analysis concludes that "the lan-
guage is clear and the statute comprehensive. "I80 The plain lan-
guage states no exemption, nor does the available legislative
history support an alternative interpretation. Yet, the constitu-
tional and institutional concerns identified since the statute's
passage in 1984 have not gone unnoticed by Congress in other
areas.181 The fact that Congress has yet to react to these con-
ing); Basic Chemicals, Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 220, 232 (Iowa 1977) (civil conspiracy
charging appropriation of trade secrets proven by "substantial evidence").
:80 United States v. Monsanto, 57 U.S.L.W. 4826, 4829 (U.S. June 22, 1989).
" Cited in support of the proposition that Congress could have, but chose not to
include an exception for attorneys' fees, is the so-called "Son of Sam" statute, also
passed in 1984, which exempts up to 20% of any literary profits of convicted federal
criminals that are ordered paid into a Crime Victims Fund to pay for legal representa-
tion in "matters arising from the offence for which such defendant has been convicted."
Victims of Crime Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 2175-76 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3681(c)(1)(B)(ii)
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)). 57 U.S.L.W. at 4828. In refutation of this argument, Justice
Blackmun reads that statute as excluding fees related to representation on derivative
matters such as civil law suits for damages. 57 U.S.L.W. at 4832 n.10 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The 1986 money laundering statutes also excluded attorneys' fees from its
definition of "monetary transaction" if such funds are necessary to preserve sixth
amendment rights. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(0(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Although this exemp-
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cerns by revising the forfeiture statutes is probably attributable
to its awareness that the Court was about to decide these cases
and that legislative action might be unnecessary.
Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto signal the end of the ju-
dicial storm surrounding the forfeitability of attorneys' fees in
CCE and RICO cases. 8 2 Justice Blackmun decries the result of
these cases in words that implore Congressional action: "Had it
been Congress' express aim to undermine the adversary system
as we know it, it could hardly have found a better engine of de-
struction than attorney's-fee forfeiture."18' These cases strike a
crippling blow to the principles long assumed to be a part of the
guarantee of the right to counsel; the systemic damages pre-
dicted by Justice Blackmun and others'84 can be alleviated by
prompt legislative response.
tion could be read as an opportunity to correspondingly amend the forfeiture statute3
that Congress deliberately passed by, an equally plausible explanation is that Congress
simply was limiting its consideration of the issue to this major new statutory provision
and any other revisions of existing statutes would have distracted from its main purpose.
I" In the absence of statutory revision creating a hearing in cases of post-indict-
ment restraint based solely on the probable cause established at the grand jury, it is
likely that the procedural due process issue will be relitigated, especially since a right to
a hearing has been established in the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits.
See notes 98-111 and accompanying text supra. It is doubtful that the Supreme Court
will find a due process violation in light of the majority's view that the probable cause
underlying a forfeiture count in an indictment is a sufficient basis to restrain property
since an identical standard is adequate to restrain the person. Monsanto, 57 U.S.LW. at
4830 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)).
183 Monsanto, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4834 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
I" Id.; Cloud, Forfeiting, supra note 9; Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under
RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and
How to Avoid It, 43 U. 1Afmn L Rav. 765, 781-82 (1989); text accompanying notes 63.64
supra.
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